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413 
History, Law, and Justice:  
Empirical Method and Conceptual 
Confusion in the History of Law 
 
Constantin Fasolt* 
This Article draws on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, 
Ulpian’s definition of law, and Aristotle’s definition of the polis in order to 
improve our understanding of the relationship between history, law, and 
justice. It makes three points. First, real progress can be made by taking 
one’s instruction from Wittgenstein’s lifelong attempt to banish 
meaninglessness from thought and speech. He has far more to offer than has 
been recognized to date. Second, historians of law deceive themselves if they 
believe that they can write the history of law without writing the history of 
justice at one and the same time. Law and justice are thoroughly intertwined. 
Their intertwinement constitutes their meaning. Treating one of them in 
isolation from the other impairs the meaning of both. Third, writing the 
history of law means making a commitment to a political community by 
settling disagreements with the dead. It furnishes a kind of knowledge that 
is essential for maintaining justice because it gives a meaning to “law,” 
“justice,” and “politics” without which law, justice, and politics fall to the 
judgment of the dead or that of arbitrary rulers. It does not consist of writing 
about justice, but of making judgments in writing about the history of law. 
It is neither to be confused with expressions of opinion nor with statements 
of pure fact: not expressions of opinion, because it requires statements of fact; 
not statements of pure fact, because there are no facts to state without 
agreement in the judgments that make a political community.  
  
 
* Karl J. Weintraub Professor of History and the College, The University of Chicago. I would like to 
thank Christopher Tomlins for inviting me to contribute this Article to “‘Law As . . . ’ III: Glossolalia—
Creating a Multidisciplinary Historical Jurisprudence.” I doubt I could have written it without his 
invitation. I would also like to thank the members of the symposium for their discussion and especially 
Kunal Parker for his commentary. I am very grateful to Emily Rap for her help with formatting both 
text and notes in the proper style; to the editors of the UC Irvine Law Review for suggesting many 
improvements in style and substance; and to Anya Engel, Lead Article Editor, for her painless 
management of the editing process. Needless to say, the many faults of this Article are mine. 
Fasolt_production read v6 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 6/28/2015  9:33 PM 
414 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:413 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 415 
I. Wittgenstein ................................................................................................................. 418 
A.  Facts and Opinions ................................................................................... 418 
B.  The Fundamental Question ..................................................................... 419 
C.  Definitions .................................................................................................. 419 
D.  Reference .................................................................................................... 420 
E.  Judgment ..................................................................................................... 423 
F.  Agreement .................................................................................................. 425 
G.  Form of Life ............................................................................................... 426 
H.  Given, Not Made ....................................................................................... 427 
I.  Not “The Prison-House of Language” ................................................. 430 
J.  Not One Thing .......................................................................................... 433 
K.  Language and Reality ................................................................................ 435 
L.  Truth and Freedom ................................................................................... 437 
II. Law and Justice .......................................................................................................... 439 
A.  Law and Justice Intertwined .................................................................... 440 
B.  Etymology .................................................................................................. 443 
C.  Law .............................................................................................................. 445 
III. The History of Law .................................................................................................. 447 
A.  Ethics ........................................................................................................... 447 
B.  Politics ......................................................................................................... 449 
C.  History ......................................................................................................... 455 
D.  Empirical Method and Conceptual Confusion .................................... 458 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 461 
 
  
Fasolt_production read v6 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 6/28/2015  9:33 PM 
2015] HISTORY, LAW, AND JUSTICE 415 
The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by its being a “young 
science”; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. 
(Rather, with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology, 
there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, 
conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) 
    The existence of the experimental method makes us think that we have the means 
of getting rid of the problems which trouble us; but problem and method pass one another 
by. 
—Ludwig Wittgenstein1 
INTRODUCTION 
Debates about law and the history of law rely on any number of basic 
distinctions. Examples include distinctions between facts and norms, objective 
values and subjective opinions, public and private, law and morality, natural law and 
positive law, legislation and jurisdiction, state and church, empirical observation and 
theoretical explanation, rules and principles, legal doctrine and legal practice, and 
the like. Without such distinctions, the differences between legal positivism, legal 
realism, natural law theory, human rights theory, critical legal studies, law and 
economics, legal formalism, legal pragmatism, legal feminism, and other schools of 
thought on law and legal history would be impossible to understand. The same is 
true of the differences between primary areas of doctrinal law like property law, 
contract law, tort law, criminal law, international law, and constitutional law.2 
The problems posed by such distinctions have been debated ever since the 
distinctions were first made. We tend to be familiar with the debates provoked by 
scholars like John Austin, Hans Kelsen, Carl Schmitt, H.L.A. Hart, Michel Villey, 
John Rawls, Alasdair MacIntyre, Ronald Dworkin, and Catharine MacKinnon, 
among others. We may be less familiar with the forms in which they were debated 
by Kant, Hume, and Rousseau; Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke; Augustine, Thomas 
Aquinas, and William of Ockham—let alone Avicenna, Averroes, Maimonides, 
Confucius, Mencius, and Lao-Tze. But though the forms are different and the 
specifics vary enormously, depending on time and place, the underlying problems 
are the same. They turn on the same basic question that was asked by ancient Greek 
sophists more than two thousand years ago: is law a matter of nature or a matter of 
convention, of physis or nomos? Is man the measure of all things, as Protagoras 
 
1. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN [PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS], at xiv (P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte eds., G.E.M. Anscombe et al. trans., 
Wiley-Blackwell 4th ed. 2009) (1953). In this much-improved edition, the title Philosophical Investigations 
is reserved for what used to be called “Part I”; what used to be called “Part II” is now called Philosophy 
of Psychology—A Fragment. Hereinafter, I cite “Part I” as PI, followed by the paragraph number, for 
example, WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 78, and “Part II” as PPF, followed by the section and 
paragraph number, for example, WITTGENSTEIN, PPF, supra note 1, § xi. ¶ 338. 
2. These examples are based on the table of contents in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, at vii–x (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
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maintained? Or does justice exist quite independently of human beings in the realm 
of ideas that Plato conceived?3 
It would be foolish to contest the significance of such debates. They are quite 
obviously fundamental to our knowledge of law and the history of law. But it would 
be equally foolish to overlook how well these debates fit the definition Einstein is 
said to have given to insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and 
expecting different results. They have never once been brought to any satisfactory 
conclusion. They give rise to metaphysical illusions that lead us straight into 
conceptual confusion and that are easy to expose to ridicule. This pathology defaces, 
if it does not destroy, our meaning. It is never far removed from violence, and it 
lays the foundations for tyranny and war. 
The purpose of this Article is to gain a grip on this pathology by reconsidering 
the relationship between history, law, and justice. Needless to say, even an article as 
long as this cannot do more than scratch the surface of problems that go so deep. 
But since scratching the surface is very much worth doing, I will scratch it as well 
as I am able by making three main points. 
My first main point is this: real progress can be made by taking one’s 
instruction from Wittgenstein’s lifelong attempt to banish meaninglessness from 
thought and speech.4 I suspect that you now think, “Oh no, not again!” If so, you 
have my sympathy. I understand the impatience of historians who think that 
spending time on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philosophical 
Investigations is a needless distraction that will leave us exactly where we were before 
we started.5 But my sympathy is tempered by my belief that Wittgenstein is widely 
and deeply misunderstood—almost as much by friends as by opponents—and has 
far more to offer than has been recognized so far.6 That means that in the next part 
of this Article (Section I), I must explain Wittgenstein’s account of truth, knowledge, 
 
3. The dialogues of Plato are the locus classicus for these questions, particularly GORGIAS, 
PROTAGORAS, and THE REPUBLIC, all probably written by 380 B.C.E. See generally PLATO, GORGIAS 
(Thomas L. Pangle ed., James H. Nichols, Jr. trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1998) (c. 380 B.C.E.); PLATO, 
PROTAGORAS (Nicholas Denyer ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2008) (c. 380 B.C.E.); PLATO, THE 
REPUBLIC (G.R.F. Ferrari ed., Tom Griffith trans., Cambridge Univ. Press reprt. ed. 2003) (c. 380 
B.C.E.). 
4. There is a mountain of literature about Wittgenstein and at least a respectable hill about the 
bearing of his thought on the theory of law. See, e.g., WITTGENSTEIN AND LAW (Dennis M. Patterson 
ed., 2004); WITTGENSTEIN AND LEGAL THEORY (Dennis M. Patterson ed., 1992); PHIL. TOPICS, Fall 
2010 (collecting essays on the topic of moral disagreement). 
5. See, e.g., WITTGENSTEIN AND LAW, supra note 4; WITTGENSTEIN AND LEGAL THEORY, 
supra note 4; PHIL. TOPICS, supra note 4. 
6. As Newton Garver, speaking about philosophy in America, puts it: “Wittgenstein has no 
significant following. People recognize him, read him, cite him, and discuss him; but few take up 
philosophy in his manner, or modify their thinking in line with the main thrusts of his work.” NEWTON 
GARVER, THIS COMPLICATED FORM OF LIFE: ESSAYS ON WITTGENSTEIN 73 (1994). THE NEW 
WITTGENSTEIN (Alice Crary & Rupert Read eds., 2000) and Cora Diamond, Criss-Cross Philosophy, in 
WITTGENSTEIN AT WORK: METHOD IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 201 (Erich 
Ammereller & Eugen Fischer eds., 2004), offer good guidance to much of the evidence in support of 
this claim. The situation in philosophy obviously differs from the situation in legal history. But the basic 
diagnosis is valid in both. 
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reality, and freedom at some considerable length and ask you for your patience in 
indulging the explanation before I can turn to the relationship between history, law, 
and justice.7 Given how many conflicting views of Wittgenstein there are, there is 
no other way to start without lapsing into immediate confusion. 
Having relied on Wittgenstein to clarify the meaning of “truth,” “knowledge,” 
“reality,” and “freedom,” I will examine the relationship between history, law, and 
justice. I will do so in two separate steps, which correspond to Sections II and III 
of this Article. First, in Section II, I will tackle the relationship between law and 
justice as such, apart from history. I will draw on my reading of Wittgenstein, the 
etymology of “law” and “justice,” and Ulpian’s definition of law in order to 
establish, not only that law and justice are thoroughly intertwined, but also that their 
intertwinement constitutes their meaning. Treating one of them in isolation from 
the other impairs the meaning of both. The results of such impairment may not be 
easy to imagine for anyone who has not actually experienced them, or finds it 
difficult to follow where Nietzsche, Kafka, and Beckett have led. But they are 
certainly not good. 
This understanding of the relationship between law and justice has an 
important implication for historians of law: they deceive themselves if they believe 
that they can write the history of law without writing the history of justice at one 
and the same time. This is my second point. 
In Section III, I will explain what “writing the history of justice” means. It 
does not mean writing about justice. It means making political commitments in 
writing about the history of law. If law and justice are thoroughly intertwined, it 
follows that they are essentially political, in the capacious sense that Aristotle gave to 
the word “political.”8 They must not be confused with ethics. Their history turns in 
large part on disagreements among the living and the dead about what law and 
justice truly are. Not to engage those disagreements, in an effort to maintain 
historical objectivity, is not to serve the truth by staying out of politics. Quite the 
contrary: this puts the truth at risk by failing to maintain it. 
 
7. My understanding of Wittgenstein has benefited most from the writings of Rush Rhees, 
Norman Malcolm, Georg Henrik von Wright, G.E.M. Anscombe, Peter Winch, Stanley Cavell, D.Z. 
Phillips, Ernst Tugendhat, Cora Diamond, James Conant, and Joachim Schulte, and the following titles 
in particular: G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, AN ANALYTICAL COMMENTARY ON THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1983); STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON: 
WITTGENSTEIN, SKEPTICISM, MORALITY, AND TRAGEDY (reprt. ed. 1999); CORA DIAMOND, THE 
REALISTIC SPIRIT: WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE MIND (1991); THE NEW 
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 6; James Conant, The Method of the Tractatus, in FROM FREGE TO 
WITTGENSTEIN: PERSPECTIVES ON EARLY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 374 (Erich H. Reck ed., 2002) 
[hereinafter Conant, Method]; James Conant, Throwing Away the Top of the Ladder, 79 YALE REV. 328 
(1990); Cora Diamond, Throwing Away the Ladder, 63 PHILOSOPHY 5 (1988); John McDowell, Non-
Cognitivism and Rule-Following, in WITTGENSTEIN: TO FOLLOW A RULE 141 (Steven H. Holtzman & 
Christopher M. Leach eds., 1981); and Barry Stroud, Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity, 74 PHIL. REV. 504 
(1965). 
8. See 11 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS § 1.i.1–12 (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press reprt. ed. 
1944) (c. 350 B.C.E). 
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It does not follow that writing the history of law amounts to replacing 
scholarship with the expression of opinions. Much less does it follow that 
scholarship must be restricted to pure facts. Facts and opinions—facts and values, 
if you prefer the terminology conventionally used since the beginning of the 
twentieth century for a distinction similarly drawn between “facts and theory,” 
“facts and interpretation,” or “facts and fiction”—are just as deeply intertwined as 
law and justice. Treating facts in isolation from opinions has the same result as 
treating law in isolation from justice: it impairs the meaning of both. It diminishes 
not only our ability to state facts, as is well understood after more than a century of 
criticism claiming that objectivity is but a “noble dream,” but also our ability to 
express opinions, as is barely understood at all, and only very rarely pointed out as 
clearly as by Harry Frankfurt in On Bullshit.9 
What does follow, as summed up in the Conclusion, is something altogether 
different. Namely this: the history of law furnishes a kind of knowledge that is 
essential for maintaining justice. This is my third point. 
I.  WITTGENSTEIN 
A. Facts and Opinions 
Justice does not rank very highly on the list of subjects to which historians of 
law pay close attention. That may seem strange to naïve observers. They will wonder 
what point there is to legal history if it does not concern itself with justice. Is the 
history of law not about breaking and observing law? About bad laws that were 
abolished and good laws that were put into effect? Is it not the point of law to 
protect the innocent from injustice and make the guilty pay just compensation for 
their crimes? Justice would appear to be the central issue in the history of law. 
Historians of law will hardly see it like that. They will point out that justice is 
not the same as law. They would need a reason to turn themselves into historians 
of justice, too. But what could such a reason be? Historians deal with things that 
change. Law definitely changes. That makes it a good subject for historical 
investigation. But justice? There is perhaps no better candidate to claim that it is 
always one and the same, timeless, immutable, immortal. This makes justice a 
subject fit for philosophers, theologians, and theorists of law and politics; but not 
for historians. 
One may of course reject the view that justice never changes. In that case, 
historians of law would have a reason to turn themselves into historians of justice, 
too. But if they tried, they would have to confront a problem no one has ever solved: 
people cannot agree what justice is. Judges cannot avoid that problem. They are 
obliged to render judgment where people cannot come to terms. But historians do 
not seem to have that obligation. As historians, we are obliged to furnish knowledge 
 
9. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT (2005); see also PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE 
DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988). 
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of the past. We can fulfill our obligation by examining past people’s disagreements 
about justice, opinions they were holding at one time or another, laws by which they 
tried to solve their disagreements, court proceedings, and so on. But justice itself? 
Where has it ever been recorded? We had better stick to things that can be 
documented. Opinions about justice can. Law can. Justice cannot. Historians of law 
are wise, it seems, if they keep mum about the place of justice in the history of law. 
Considerations of this kind would not be hard to multiply. Yet those naïve 
observers have a much better case than it may seem. I do not mean that justice has 
to be the subject of our histories. Nor do I mean that we should turn our histories 
into expressions of opinion about the rights and wrongs committed in the past. And 
I definitely do not mean what may well seem to be the only possible alternative: that 
we should focus entirely on facts and leave opinions out of consideration. What I 
do mean is that the distinction between facts (of law) and opinions (about justice) 
hides the truth about the relationship between history, law, and justice. The truth is 
that without justice there is no history of law. 
B. The Fundamental Question 
One can of course distinguish facts from opinions. Indeed one must, so long 
at least as one believes that claims to truth and knowledge need to be justified. This 
makes it tempting to take the distinction between facts and opinions as the basis on 
which to figure out how justice might be related to law. How else are we supposed 
to figure it out? It seems completely reasonable to postpone investigations of the 
relationship between law and justice until we have been able to sift as many facts as 
possible from the vast store of myths, legends, ill-founded suppositions, 
stereotypes, commonplaces, stock phrases, and other types of opinion spilling out 
of our libraries. Why not begin by setting our opinions to one side and paying close 
attention to what we can actually prove? 
But this is not at all as reasonable as it seems. On the contrary, it begs a 
fundamental question. The question is: How can we tell what we are talking about 
in the first place? Not just when we are talking about history, law, and justice, but 
about anything at all. To say, “We can tell what we are talking about by separating 
facts from opinions,” is not an answer to the question. It looks like one. But it 
merely raises the same question in a new form. The new form is: What is the 
difference between facts and opinions? The underlying question is still the same: 
How can we tell what we are talking about? How can we tell whether it is a fact or 
an opinion? What is “it”? Without an answer to that question, the distinction 
between facts and opinions merely distracts our attention from the minimum 
amount of knowledge we need in order to distinguish anything whatever from 
anything whatever else. That minimum is knowledge of just what is in question. 
C. Definitions 
How can we tell what we are talking about, not just in the case of something 
as complicated as history, law, and justice, but in the case of something so simple 
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that the answer may seem blindingly obvious? Take Mount Everest, for example.10 
How can we tell that we are talking about Mount Everest when we say “Mount 
Everest”? The answer may well seem to be: we can tell if we define the meaning of 
“Mount Everest.” We can define it by saying, “Mount Everest is the highest 
mountain on earth,” or “Mount Everest is the mountain first climbed by Edmund 
Hillary,” or “Mount Everest is the mountain at latitude 27.9881 North and longitude 
86.9253 East.” That’s how we know what we are talking about. And if that is not 
good enough, we can always go to the Himalayas and point at Mount Everest itself. 
What better definition could there be? 
But that is not the issue. The issue is: What are we pointing at when we are 
saying “Mount Everest”? How can we be certain that when we say “Mount Everest” 
next time, and the time after that, we mean the same thing we meant when we were 
pointing at it before? How can we be certain that others understood what we were 
pointing at? What did we define? 
There we stood, trying to define the meaning of “Mount Everest” for our 
ignorant companion. We stretched out our hand in a particular direction. Our 
companion looked in the same direction. What did we see? We saw a great many 
different things: a mountain was one of them; its size was another; so were its shape 
and color, the snow with which it was covered, the earth on which it stood, its peak, 
the rocks on its flanks, the sky behind it, and so on. We could have been pointing 
at any one of these things. How could our companion tell that we were pointing at 
a mountain, and not its size or shape? At this mountain, as opposed to a mountain? 
What is to stop our companion from thinking, ‘“Mount Everest’ means ‘a 
mountain,’” and going on to point at Mount Fuji saying, “Look, there is Mount 
Everest”? Why should he or she not be puzzled if we were to reply, “Wait a minute, 
that’s not Mount Everest, that’s Mount Fuji. Don’t you remember that I was 
pointing at Mount Everest when I defined the meaning of ‘Mount Everest’?” Why 
should our companion not respond, “But of course I remember what you were 
pointing at. You were pointing at Mount Everest. You were there. Don’t you see 
that the thing which I am pointing at right now is the same as the thing which you 
were pointing at then?” How can we make our definitions stick to the things that 
we are trying to define? How can we stop them from sliding off in all directions? 
How are they connected with reality? 
D. Reference 
Wittgenstein was obviously far from the first to recognize that definitions are 
not enough to guarantee that we can tell what we are talking about.11 This 
 
10. The example of Mount Everest is taken from PETER WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL 
SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY 24–39 (2d ed. 1990). Wittgenstein himself used Mont 
Blanc as an example. See WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 78; WITTGENSTEIN, PPF, supra note 1, 
§ xi. ¶ 338. 
11. Many of Plato’s dialogues focus precisely on the problem. See, e.g., PLATO, EUTHYPHRO, 
translated in EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO 1 (F.J. Church & Robert D. Cumming trans., 2d rev. ed. 
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recognition has a history of well over two thousand years. It goes back at least as 
far as Socrates; it led Plato to argue that ideas exist quite independently of our 
definitions; and it has given rise to a rich harvest of many different kinds of 
metaphysics, epistemology, and hermeneutics, from Aristotle to Augustine, from 
Thomas Aquinas to Descartes, and from Hume, Kant, and Hegel to Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, and Gadamer. But as far as I can tell, all kinds of metaphysics, 
differences notwithstanding, try to answer the question how we can make our 
definitions stick to reality by referring to some kind of thing that neither can nor 
needs to be defined because it is immediately given—and all of them fall short 
because they beg the very question they are supposed to answer: What is 
immediately given? Calling something “immediately given” as opposed to “plain 
given” makes not a bit of difference to the question what is given, however it is 
given: immediately, mediately, by the senses, by pure thinking, and so forth. 
The result is a curiously mixed-up state of affairs, a twilight zone we enter 
whenever we try to answer the question of just what we are talking about by referring 
to something immediately given, and from which we cannot escape as long as we 
try to distinguish facts from opinions without first settling what we are talking about. 
This is the condition Wittgenstein deplored in his diagnosis of the state of 
contemporary psychology on the last page of the Philosophical Investigations: 
The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by its 
being a “young science”; its state is not comparable with that of physics, 
for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather, with that of certain branches of 
mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology, there are experimental 
methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion 
and methods of proof.) 
  The existence of the experimental method makes us think that we have 
the means of getting rid of the problems which trouble us; but problem 
and method pass one another by.12 
History, of course, is not the same as psychology. Its method is not experimental. 
But it is empirical, and empirical methods are closely related to experimental 
methods. They rest on the same concept of experience. In that regard, 
Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of psychology applies directly to history as well: the 
existence of an empirical method makes us think that we have the means of getting 
rid of the problems that trouble us—such as the relationship between evidence and 
interpretation, legal reality and legal theory, past and present, and so on—but 
problem and method pass one another by. 
We read the evidence. We are no longer so naïve as to believe that it is really 
immediately given. More than a century has passed since Dilthey, Nietzsche, and 
 
1956) (on the definition of piety); PLATO, MENO, translated in MENO AND PHAEDO 1 (David Sedley & 
Alex Long eds., 2011) (on the definition of virtue); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, supra note 3 (on the 
definition of justice); PLATO, THE SYMPOSIUM (M.C. Howatson & Frisbee C.C. Sheffield eds., M.C. 
Howatson trans., 2008) (on the definition of love). 
12. WITTGENSTEIN, PPF, supra note 1, § xiv. ¶ 371 (emphasis added). 
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Troeltsch made that impossible.13 But we still use it as the foundation on which we 
study history. We have a rich body of theories devoted to the question how we can 
get from evidence to history. Some think the problem is purely practical and can be 
solved by doing better what we were doing all along. Others think the problem is 
impossible to solve, and maybe the past does not even exist at all. Most of us opt 
for more or less attenuated versions of these opposed extremes. But none of us 
directly face the questions: How can we tell what our evidence is giving us? What 
does it document? What do we read in it? Instead of facing these questions, we jump 
to the conclusion that it must be one of two things: facts or opinions; reality or 
interpretations of reality; social reality or intellectual reality; consequences of 
thinking or effects of material causation; culture or nature; history or physics; and 
so on. 
And then we enter the twilight zone. We do not realize how little of a 
difference it makes whether we opt to talk about ideas or matter, agency or structure, 
the present or the past. Take your pick. Join the idealists, the materialists, the 
structuralists, or the poststructuralists. You still rely on reference, regardless of what 
it may be a reference to, even if you are fighting it. The question keeps coming back: 
How do you know that you are talking about ideas, material causes, structure, or 
even reference itself? Call it res cogitans, or call it res extensa.14 How do you know it is 
a thing at all? Whoever relies on reference in order to answer the question how we 
can tell what we are talking about is setting out on an infinite regress. Unless we 
face the futility of that regress and come to a full stop, we are bound sooner or later 
to end up in what is often called the “prison-house of language,” where reference 
drops out, insanity drops in, and all of us are welcome to join Vladimir and Estragon 
in Waiting for Godot.15 
 
13. See generally 1 WILHELM DILTHEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE HUMAN SCIENCES (Rudolf A. 
Makkreel & Frithjof Rodi eds., 1989); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY 
(Adrian Collins trans., 2d rev. ed. 1957) (1873); ERNST TROELTSCH, DER HISTORISMUS UND SEINE 
PROBLEME [HISTORICISM AND ITS PROBLEMS] (1922) (Ger.). 
14. The famous distinction drawn by RENÉ DESCARTES, PRINCIPIA PHILOSOPHIAE 
[PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY] (1644) (Neth.), translated in 1 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF 
DESCARTES 177, 208 ( John Cottingham et al. trans., 1985). 
15. See FREDRIC JAMESON, THE PRISON-HOUSE OF LANGUAGE: A CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF 
STRUCTURALISM AND RUSSIAN FORMALISM (1972). Nietzsche is often invoked as the inventor of the 
concept, but he did not actually use it. It results from a loose translation of sprachlicher Zwang by Erich 
Heller. See David Lovekin, A Response to Timothy Casey’s Review of: Technique, Discourse and 
Consciousness: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jacques Ellul, ELLUL F., Jan. 1995, at 11. It is 
one of the great ironies in the history of philosophy that Wittgenstein, so far from being admired for 
having exposed “the prison-house of language” as pure nonsense, was almost universally regarded as 
one of its main architects until Cora Diamond began to set the record straight. See Diamond, supra note 
7. Wittgenstein is still so regarded by most of those who have made the so-called “linguistic turn.” 
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E. Judgment 
It was Wittgenstein’s genius to find an answer to the question how we can tell 
what we are talking about that requires no reference to anything at all. His answer 
was: 
It is not only agreement in definitions, but also (odd as it may sound) 
agreement in judgements that is required for communication by means of 
language. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.16 
To the extent that it is possible to divide the Philosophical Investigations into successive 
parts, the short paragraph from which this quotation is taken concludes a long line 
of thought of more than a hundred paragraphs devoted to the question what it 
means to understand a sentence correctly. It sums up two important points. 
First, Wittgenstein says that “communication by means of language”—saying 
something and understanding what is being said—requires two different kinds of 
things: not only agreement in definitions, but also agreement in judgments. He 
means “judgments” in the most comprehensive and elementary sense: making a 
distinction by means of some criterion.17 The significance of criteria in 
Wittgenstein’s thinking is notoriously controversial.18 But the basic point is simple: 
a criterion is anything we use in order to tell things apart. We tell them apart by 
comparing them with our criterion and judging which of them do, and which do 
not, meet the criterion. The criterion can be a sample, a ruler, a table, a thermometer, 
a tuning fork, a star, a book, a human being, a law, a judicial precedent—pretty 
much anything, really. There are no inherent, given, or predetermined characteristics 
that turn a given thing into a criterion. It depends on the kind of things we are trying 
to tell apart. 
When we say, “This thing is red,” we judge the color of this thing: we make a 
distinction between this thing and things that are blue, yellow, orange, fuchsia, or 
any color other than red. If we are asked to justify our judgment, we do so by 
comparing the thing with whatever we use as our criterion of red. The criterion 
could be a sample of red; it could be the CIE 1931 color space chromaticity diagram; 
or it could be an electromagnetic wavelength. Similarly, if we say, “This thing is a 
foot long,” we judge the length of this thing: we make a distinction between this 
thing and all things that have lengths other than one foot. If we are asked to justify 
our judgment, we do so by comparing the thing with whatever we use as our 
criterion of length: our foot, a ruler, a tape measure, or the standard meter bar in 
Paris. And so on. There are as many different criteria as there are different kinds of 
 
16. “Zur Verständigung durch die Sprache gehört nicht nur eine Übereinstimmung in den 
Definitionen, sondern (so seltsam dies klingen mag) eine Übereinstimmung in den Urteilen. Dies 
scheint die Logik aufzuheben; hebt sie aber nicht auf.” WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 242. 
17. The German Urteil reflects this meaning more clearly than “judgment.” The prefix Ur- 
qualifies whatever follows as being the “first,” “original,” “fundamental,” or “primary” in its kind; the 
noun Teil means “part”; and the verb teilen means “to divide.” The noun Urteil thus means something 
like “a primary distinction” or “original division.” 
18. GARVER, supra note 6, at 177–96, offers an effective introduction. CAVELL, supra note 7, at 
1–125, remains one of the best accounts of the place of judgments in Wittgenstein’s thinking. 
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things. What makes something a criterion is simply that we use it to make 
distinctions. 
This means that there is no such thing as being able to tell what something is 
except by reference to a criterion—a standard, a rule, a sample—that we can use in 
order to distinguish it from other things. Note how fundamentally reference to a 
criterion differs from reference to “reality.” Reference to reality is supposed to be 
reference to something given, something that could conceivably exist independently 
of us. Reference to a criterion is reference to something we use. Apart from our use 
of it there is no criterion, and apart from a criterion the very concepts of difference 
and identity are meaningless. In itself, which means precisely “apart from a criterion 
of judgment,” nothing is different from anything else. For that matter, in itself 
nothing is the same as anything else either, including itself. Not even “2” on the left 
side of the equation is “in itself” the same as “2” on the right side of the equation. 
What could it mean to say that “2” is “the same” as itself, just like that, without 
reference to a criterion to tell us whether we are talking about a number, a font, or 
a squiggle? Would it mean that 2+2=2, just as 0+0=0, or as “James” is one person 
today and one person tomorrow, but even so does not add up to two people? What 
could it mean to say that a=a, and call that the law of identity? It means nothing at 
all.19 
If that is what Heraclitus had in mind when he said that you cannot step into 
the same river twice and that war is the father of all things,20 then Heraclitus was 
right. Without criteria, everything does flow. No evidence, no data, and no 
definition can tell us what something is. Only we can tell what something is. We do 
so by making a judgment, and we make the judgment by using a criterion in order 
to make distinctions between things. Making such judgments allows us to tell what 
the evidence is evidence of; what the data are data for; and what the definition is a 
definition of: of this, but not of that; of a mountain, not of its shape. That gives meaning 
to evidence, data, and definitions. Without judgments, we spin our wheels in vain. 
 
19.  
   But isn’t at least the same the same? 
   For identity we seem to have an infallible paradigm: namely, in the identity of a thing 
with itself. I feel like saying: “Here at any rate there can’t be different interpretations. If 
someone sees a thing, he sees identity too.” 
   Then are two things the same when they are what one thing is? And how am I to apply 
what the one thing shows me to the case of two things? 
WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 215. Wittgenstein goes on to make fun of the law of identity: 
   “A thing is identical with itself.”—There is no finer example of a useless sentence, 
which nevertheless is connected with a certain play of the imagination. It is as if in our 
imagination we put a thing into its own shape and saw that it fitted. 
. . . . 
   “Every coloured patch fits exactly into its surrounding” is a somewhat specialized form 
of the law of identity. 
Id. ¶ 216. For an instructive look at the concept of identity, see Cora Diamond, How Long Is the Standard 
Meter in Paris?, in WITTGENSTEIN IN AMERICA 104 (Timothy McCarthy & Sean C. Stidd eds., 2001). 
20. HERMANN DIELS, DIE FRAGMENTE DER VORSOKRATIKER: GRIECHISCH UND DEUTSCH 
[THE FRAGMENTS OF THE PRESOCRATICS] (Walther Kranz ed., 1964) (Ger.). 
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F. Agreement 
Wittgenstein also spells out that definitions and judgments by themselves are 
not enough for communication. In order to understand each other, we also need to 
be in agreement on the definitions we use and the judgments we make.21 
As far as definitions are concerned, that is relatively easy. Our agreement on 
definitions is both wide and obvious: we have dictionaries in which it is lovingly 
spelled out. Of course our definitions are often not precise enough for scholarship 
and science, and there are many definitions on which we do not agree. But none of 
this seems to prevent us from communicating with each other, even about 
definitions that are contentious or imprecise. 
With judgments, however, it is more difficult. Our judgments appear to be a 
matter of opinion, as diverse and variable as the weather. How, then, can agreement 
in judgments serve as a foundation for communication? Do we not need to 
communicate first in order to reach agreement in our judgments later? If agreement 
in judgments really were required for communication, there would seem to be only 
two equally depressing possibilities: Either we do not reach agreement, in which 
case there is no communication at all. We would be locked inside our own little 
private worlds. Or we do reach agreement. In that case there would be 
communication, but it would only be communication of a sort, because it would be 
restricted to exchanging nothing but opinions. The distinction between true and 
false could be replaced with the distinction between opinions we like and opinions 
we don’t like. We could be talking a great deal without saying anything at all. 
Wittgenstein explicitly acknowledged that identifying agreement in judgments 
as a requirement for communication sounds “odd” and “seems to abolish logic.”22 
But he also insisted that the threat is imaginary. He explained why it is imaginary in 
the paragraph immediately preceding his statement about agreement in definitions 
and judgments: 
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is 
false?”—What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their 
language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but 
rather in form of life.23 
Here the interlocutor with whom Wittgenstein keeps arguing in different guises 
throughout the Philosophical Investigations draws one of the conclusions that seem to 
follow from his insistence on the need for agreement in judgments in order to 
communicate. The conclusion is “that human agreement decides what is true and 
what is false.”24 If that were true, it would indeed abolish logic. Logic has no place 
 
21. See WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 242. 
22. Id. 
23. “‘So sagst du also, daß die Übereinstimmung der Menschen entscheide, was richtig und was 
falsch ist?’—Richtig und falsch ist, was Menschen sagen; und in der Sprache stimmen die Menschen 
überein. Dies ist keine Übereinstimmung der Meinungen, sondern der Lebensform.” Id. ¶ 241. 
24. Id. Note that actually Wittgenstein does not speak of what is “true” but of what is richtig, 
meaning “correct.” “Correct” has a wider meaning than “true.” If I am telling the truth, then I am doing 
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in a system of reasoning in which the relationship between premises and 
conclusions depends on human agreement. 
Many readers of Wittgenstein believe that this, or some version of it, is the 
conclusion at which Wittgenstein did in fact arrive. They regard him as a skeptic 
and relativist.25 But Wittgenstein bluntly rebuts his imaginary interlocutor. He does 
so by drawing attention to the difference between saying something and speaking a 
language. Truth is a quality of something we say. So is falsity. Agreement in what we 
say surely does depend on our opinions. If our opinions differ, we will not agree in 
what we say. Nothing could be more commonplace. And nothing could be more 
obvious than that agreement in what we say is not enough to establish the truth of 
anything. It does happen that a single scientist proves all the others wrong and that 
only one solitary juror is right. But Wittgenstein is precisely not speaking about 
agreement in what we say. He is speaking about agreement in language, and 
agreement in language is nothing that anybody says. He calls it agreement “in form 
of life.”26 He does not deign to spell out the implication: human agreement does not 
decide what is true and what is false. What then does decide? That question requires 
a closer look at the concept of “form of life.” 
G. Form of Life 
Like “criterion,” “form of life” is a notoriously controversial concept whose 
basic point is easier to understand than the controversies make it seem. The basic 
point is simply that we are speaking creatures. The faculty of speech comes naturally 
to us. Since it comes naturally to us, telling the truth comes naturally to us as well. 
This is one of the things that we can do by speaking. At bottom, there is no more 
to it than that. 
What makes this point so difficult to understand is not that it is difficult, but 
that it conflicts with our expectations. We are not satisfied to take our form of life 
for what it is. We want an explanation for our ability to tell the truth. We do not 
realize that trying to explain our ability to tell the truth is trying to explain the 
reasons why we are able to explain the reasons why we are able to explain the 
reasons why we are able to explain the reasons why . . . and so on. It makes no 
 
something correctly. But I can do something correctly without telling the truth—for example, by telling 
a good lie or plagiarizing a novel. This is important. It helps, for example, to distinguish between truth 
(which cannot be false) and inference (which can be correct, even if the result is false), or the difference 
between something that is good in an absolute sense (so that it cannot be bad) and good in a relative 
sense (so that it can be good to achieve a certain end, even if the end is bad). I cannot pursue this further 
here. 
25. For concise and characteristically contemptuous accounts of Wittgenstein along such lines, 
see generally Ernest Gellner, A Wittgensteinian Philosophy of (or Against) the Social Sciences, 5 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 
173 (1975) [hereinafter Gellner, A Wittgensteinian Philosophy]; and Ernest Gellner, The Gospel According 
to Ludwig, 53 AM. SCHOLAR 243 (1984) (book review) [hereinafter Gellner, The Gospel]. The latter is a 
sympathetic review of SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE: AN 
ELEMENTARY EXPOSITION (1982), which in turn is probably the single most influential interpretation 
of Wittgenstein as a skeptic. 
26. See WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 241. 
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sense. It leads to an infinite regress that will not stop until we stop asking the 
question that fuels the regress—unless, of course, we stop it arbitrarily by endowing 
our ability to tell the truth with metaphysical significance. This is what makes it hard 
to understand the concept “form of life”: our desire to look for explanations where 
explanations make no sense. 
As far as I can tell, this desire leads to three basic misunderstandings of the 
concept “form of life.” One is to confuse our form of life with some one thing, or 
with a single system of many different things. Another is to confuse it with 
something we can make up or change at will. The third is to confuse it with 
something we can neither make up nor change in any way at all. 
The first is the most basic: it leads straight back to metaphysical investigations 
into the nature of reality. It begs the question how we can tell what something is. 
The second leads to a particular variety of metaphysics: it confuses our ability to 
speak with a magical power to turn reality into whatever we say it is. The third leads 
to the directly opposite variety of metaphysics: it confuses our ability to speak with 
life imprisonment inside a “prison-house of language” in which, so far from having 
magical powers over reality, we cannot even make contact with reality at all.27 I shall 
deal with the second and the third before I turn to the first. 
H. Given, Not Made 
A good way to clarify why agreement in form of life is not changeable at will 
is to consider the etymology of “agreement.” The root of “agreement” is the same 
as that of the Latin gratia and its English derivative “grace.” It refers to something 
that is “agreeable” in the sense of “pleasant.” Whether or not something is pleasant 
in the sense that it “agrees” with us is not a matter of opinion. It is a matter of our 
nature. It just so happens that we are pleased by a certain range of temperatures and 
displeased by others, regardless of whatever opinions we may have about them; that 
we like the taste of sugar but not of sulfuric acid; that garlic does not agree with all 
of us; and so on. This kind of agreement is not immutable. But neither is it 
something that we can change at will. 
The same point is embedded in the etymology of other words for 
“agreement.” Wittgenstein’s German word is Übereinstimmung. Stimme means 
“voice,” and Übereinstimmung, taken literally, means something like “being joined in 
sound” or “sounding in one voice.” It is the kind of agreement produced by 
different singers singing the same song with different voices and by different 
musicians playing the same tune with different instruments.28 What the singers sing 
 
27. For a particularly influential statement of this position, see Roland Barthes, The Discourse of 
History, in 3 COMPARATIVE CRITICISM: A YEARBOOK 7 (E.S. Shaffer ed., Stephen Bann trans., 1981); 
compare JAMESON, supra note 15. 
28. Wittgenstein was never shy to insist that speaking is far more closely related to performing 
music than we tend to believe: “Speech with and without thought is to be compared to playing a piece 
of music with and without thought.” WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 341; see also id. ¶ 527 
(“Understanding a sentence in language is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than one 
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and the musicians play is very much a matter of choice, will, and deliberation. But 
how it sounds is not. (One wishes that it were!) 
“Consent” teaches a special lesson. In English it is difficult to imagine consent 
without deliberation, choice, will, and expressions of opinion. Consent in this sense 
is obviously something that is consciously given and for which one can be held 
responsible. But the root of “consent” is the same as that of the Latin word sentire 
and its English cognates “sentiment,” “sensation,” and, above all, “sense,” meaning 
both “bodily sense” and “meaning.”29 What Wittgenstein has in mind when he 
contrasts agreement in form of life with agreement in opinions is like the contrast 
between agreeing in bodily sense and agreeing in making the same choice. Both are 
agreements in a sense. Hence we can refer to both of them by using words derived 
from one and the same root. At the same time, they differ from each other as deeply 
as feeling something differs from choosing something. Agreement in form of life 
means consenting in the kind of sense we feel. Agreement in opinions means 
consenting in the kind of sense we mean. 
Thus, agreement in form of life basically means no more than that we are alike 
as human beings. This is not something we bring about by thinking or acting. Much 
less does this determine whether one or another thing is true or false. It just happens 
to be the case. We are born, we die, we eat, we drink, we mate, we sleep, we dream, 
we laugh, we cry, we hear sounds, we see colors, and so on. These are some of what 
Wittgenstein called “extremely general facts of nature: such facts as are hardly ever 
mentioned because of their great generality,” and “facts that no one has doubted, 
which have escaped notice only because they are always before our eyes.”30 They go 
directly into our agreement in form of life. They make it possible for us to form the 
agreement in judgments we need in order to be able to communicate with each 
other by means of language about opinions, which may be true or false, and on 
which we may or may not agree. 
In order not to misunderstand what this means, it is crucial to recognize that 
agreement in judgments, let alone opinions, is not derived from agreement in form 
of life, and that the “extremely general facts of nature” that go into our agreement 
in form of life do not constitute a reason or an explanation why we agree in our 
judgments. Reason, explanation, and justification have their place within our form 
of life. There is no such thing as a reason for our agreement in judgments, language, 
 
may think.”); cf. id. ¶ 224 (“The word ‘accord’ [Übereinstimmung] and the word ‘rule’ are related to one 
another; they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of the other with 
it.”). 
29. The definitions of “sense” offered by the CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT 
ENGLISH 1152–53 (H.W. Fowler & F.G. Fowler eds., 5th ed. 1964) include “bodily . . . sensation,” 
“ability to perceive or feel,” “consciousness,” “insight into some specific matter,” “practical wisdom,” 
“judgement,” “common [sense],” “meaning,” “intelligibility,” and “prevailing sentiment.” 
30. WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶¶ 142, 415. The main text of PI ¶ 142 is the source of 
the often-quoted observation that “[t]he procedure of putting a lump of cheese on a balance and fixing 
the price by the turn of the scale would lose its point if it frequently happened that such lumps suddenly 
grew or shrank with no obvious cause.” Id. ¶ 142. 
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and form of life. Looking for reasons to justify our agreement in form of life is 
tantamount to looking for them beyond the limits of our language, where there are 
no reasons whatsoever—and looking for them in physics is to confuse logic with 
natural events. The point of distinguishing agreement in form of life from 
agreement in opinions is logical, not physical. Of course there are physical and 
biological explanations of the reasons why we have the same sensations; why a 
certain electrical impulse applied to our brain may change our visual impressions; 
why certain drugs can alter our moods. But these explanations do not explain the 
logical role of our agreement in form of life. Logically speaking, there is no reason 
for our agreement in form of life at all. It simply happens to be what it is. 
Wittgenstein goes out of his way to stress this point towards the very end of 
the Philosophical Investigations: 
I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different, people 
would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). Rather: if 
anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and 
that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we 
realize—then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be 
different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different 
from the usual ones will become intelligible to him.31 
Agreement in form of life, agreement in language, and agreement in judgments are 
of course three different kinds of agreement. The differences are crucial in order to 
account for cultural and historical differences between human beings living in 
different times and places.32 But what matters here is that none of these three 
agreements is a matter of opinion. None of them is a matter of (consciously) 
believing anything, (deliberately) choosing anything, or (intentionally) doing 
anything. They constitute a kind of social contract, but a contract that is given, not 
made; learned, not invented; open, not closed. They are something in which all of 
us participate but not something anyone of us does intentionally, for a purpose. 
They are the manner in which—but not the reason why—we are able to speak and 
understand each other, no matter which particular language we happen to have 
learned when we were young. As Wittgenstein put it, “Shared human behaviour is 
the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language.”33 
It is tempting to characterize as “intransitive” the kind of agreement 
Wittgenstein is at such pains to distinguish from agreement in opinions. It is 
 
31. WITTGENSTEIN, PPF, supra note 1, § xii. ¶ 366; see also id. § xii. ¶ 365 (“If concept formation 
can be explained by facts of nature, shouldn’t we be interested, not in grammar, but rather in what is 
its basis in nature?—We are, indeed, also interested in the correspondence between concepts and very 
general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality). But our 
interest is not thereby thrown back on to these possible causes of concept formation; we are not doing 
natural science; nor yet natural history—since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our 
purposes.”); cf. WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 142 (“What we have to mention in order to explain 
the significance, I mean the importance, of a concept are often extremely general facts of nature: such 
facts as are hardly ever mentioned because of their great generality.”). 
32. I will address the significance of such differences. See infra Part III.B (“Politics”). 
33. WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 206. 
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tempting because in The Brown Book he did in fact distinguish between “transitive” 
uses of language (referring to something) and “intransitive” or “reflexive” uses of 
language (not referring to anything) in order to clarify the logical trouble into which 
we get ourselves if we fail to distinguish these uses clearly from each other.34 But in 
the Philosophical Investigations he abandoned the terminology of “transitive” and 
“intransitive” uses of language and replaced it by distinguishing the “empirical” use 
of a certain combination of words (in a statement about an object in the world) 
from the “grammatical” use of the same combination of words (in a statement about 
language).35 That is a powerful reason not to revert to the terminology he used in 
The Brown Book. But the distinction between “transitive” and “intransitive” uses of 
language does help us to understand what Wittgenstein meant by using a 
combination of words “grammatically”; why “agreement in form of life” is not a 
matter of opinions; and why failure to observe the distinction between “empirical” 
and “grammatical” uses of words is an abundant source of metaphysical illusions 
that can wreak havoc with our agreement in form of life.36 
I. Not “The Prison-House of Language” 
So much for confusing our form of life with something we can change as we 
please. Now for the opposite misunderstanding: that we are prisoners of our form 
of life. Many readers regard Wittgenstein as a conservative enemy of the 
Enlightenment who loved tradition and denied the possibility of subjecting custom 
and religion to rational critique, allegedly on the grounds that we can never step 
outside our form of life.37 As far as I can tell, such readers are simply wrong.38 
Wittgenstein’s point is not that there is anything we cannot subject to rational 
 
34. Compare LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS: PRELIMINARY 
STUDIES FOR THE “PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS” 158, 160–62 (2d ed. 1960), with 
WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 251. I owe the reference to The Brown Book to Diamond, supra note 
19, at 110–13. 
35. Cf. WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 58 (“But what we really want is simply to take ‘Red 
exists’ as the statement: the word ‘red’ has a meaning. Or, perhaps more correctly, ‘Red does not exist’ 
as ‘“Red” has no meaning’. Only we do not want to say that the expression says this, but that this is what 
it would have to be saying if it made sense—that the expression actually contradicts itself in the attempt 
to say that just because red exists ‘in and of itself’. Whereas the only contradiction lies in something like 
this: the sentence looks as if it were about the colour, while it is supposed to be saying something about 
the use of the word ‘red’.”); id. ¶ 251 (“Of course, here ‘I can’t imagine the opposite’ doesn’t mean: my 
powers of imagination are unequal to the task. We use these words to fend off something whose form 
produces the illusion of being an empirical proposition, but which is really a grammatical one.”). 
36. Id. 
37. E.g., DAVID BLOOR, WITTGENSTEIN: A SOCIAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 85–94 (1983); 
Terry Eagleton, Wittgenstein’s Friends, NEW LEFT REV., Sept.–Oct. 1982, at 64; J.C. Nyíri, Wittgenstein 
1929–31: The Turning Back, in 4 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 29 (Stuart Shanker 
ed., 1986); J.C. Nyíri, Wittgenstein’s Later Work in Relation to Conservatism, in WITTGENSTEIN AND HIS 
TIMES 44 (Brian McGuinness ed., 1982); cf. Gellner, A Wittgensteinian Philosophy, supra note 25; Gellner, 
The Gospel, supra note 25. 
38. See DIAMOND, supra note 7, at 34 (“The idea of Wittgenstein’s philosophy as inherently 
conservative is nutty.”); cf. Alice Crary, Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in Relation to Political Thought, in THE NEW 
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 6, at 118. 
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criticism. It is that there is an indefinitely large number of judgments on which we 
happen to be agreed, not because they cannot be debated but because there is no 
debate. We can subject anything to criticism, including our nature, our form of life, 
our judgments, our religion, what have you. The fact that we happen to be agreed 
in our form of life constitutes no limit on the extent of critical reason at all. On the 
contrary, it is a logical prerequisite for the very exercise of critical reason. It gives 
critical reason its point.39 The point of subjecting something to criticism is precisely 
to withdraw it from agreement. So long as there is an agreement from which 
something can be withdrawn, there is nothing to stop us from withdrawing it. There 
is nothing to stop us from adding new judgments to our agreement either. It 
happens all the time. We still say, “The sun rises.” But now we also say, “The earth 
turns.” And since we do say that the earth turns, “the sun rises” no longer means 
what it used to mean. 
On Wittgenstein’s understanding, such subtractions and additions constitute 
the very essence of our history. They make for a lively traffic in which judgments 
that no one ever doubted come to be subjected to intense debate, while judgments 
that once upon a time could only be pronounced at the risk of torture and execution 
acquire the status of self-evident truths.40 The liveliness of that traffic depends 
entirely on the exercise of our critical reason within our form of life. That is why it 
makes sense to say that our form of life is not subject to debate (because it constitutes 
the logical prerequisite for the exercise of critical reason), and why it also makes 
sense to say that our form of life is subject to debate (because it includes the ability 
to subject any aspect of our form of life to critical examination). This, once again, 
“seems to abolish logic,” because it looks like a contradiction, “but does not do so,” 
because the contradiction is not a matter of logic, but of the difference between 
“empirical” and “grammatical” statements.41 It makes the same kind of sense as it 
made for Marx to maintain that our consciousness is determined by the mode of 
production and yet also to insist that our consciousness is perfectly capable of 
 
39. See WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 345 (“‘If it is possible for someone to make a false 
move in some game, then it could be that everybody made nothing but false moves in every game.’—
So we’re tempted to misunderstand the logic of our expressions here, to give an incorrect account of 
the use of our words. Orders are sometimes not obeyed. But what would it be like if no orders were 
ever obeyed? The concept of an order would have lost its purpose.”); see also LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, 
ON CERTAINTY § 115 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 1969) (“If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game 
of doubting itself presupposes certainty.”). 
40. This is the traffic to which Wittgenstein devoted much attention in ON CERTAINTY. See, 
e.g., id. §§ 96–98 (“96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical 
propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not 
hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard 
ones became fluid. 97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts 
may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the 
bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other. 98. But if someone were to 
say ‘So logic too is an empirical science’ he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may 
get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing.”). 
41. See WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 208. 
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examining the contradictions inherent in the society by whose mode of production 
our consciousness is determined.42 
Indeed, without belittling the differences between Wittgenstein and Marx, a 
few interpolations in a few choice quotations may show how closely Wittgenstein’s 
understanding of philosophical criticism resembles that of Marx: 
  The more closely we examine actual language [our actual form of life], 
the greater becomes the conflict between it and our requirement [the 
conflict between social reality and ideological superstructure]. (For the 
crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not something I had discovered: it 
was a requirement [of false consciousness].) The conflict becomes 
intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming vacuous.—We 
have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction, and so, in a certain 
sense, the conditions are ideal [as ideal as the German Ideology]; but also, just 
because of that, we are unable to walk. [Our alienation is complete; our 
failure to understand that the real contradiction is embedded in our form 
of life provokes a crisis.] We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the 
rough ground [of social reality]!43 . . .  
  The preconception of crystalline purity [the ideology] can only be removed 
by turning our whole inquiry around. (One might say: the inquiry must be 
turned around, but on the pivot of our real need [metaphysicians like Hegel 
must be turned right-side up by criticizing our form of life in the light of 
real human interests, instead of criticizing mere ideas in the light of purely 
philosophical speculation].)44 . . .  
  It is not the business of philosophy to resolve a contradiction by means 
of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery [as if the contradiction 
were merely a matter of ideas], but to render surveyable the state of 
mathematics that troubles us [in our actual form of life]—the state of 
affairs before the contradiction is resolved. (And in doing this one is not 
sidestepping a difficulty [because the illusion that the contradiction is a 
matter of pure ideas cannot be dispelled until the real contradiction in our 
form of life has been understood].) 
 
42. As Marx succinctly put it in his third thesis on Feuerbach as early as 1845: 
   The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and 
that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, 
forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that it is essential to educate the 
educator himself. Hence, this doctrine necessarily arrives at dividing society into two parts, 
one of which is superior to the other. 
   The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be 
conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionising practice. 
KARL MARX, THESEN ÜBER FEUERBACH [THESES ON FEUERBACH] (1888) (Russ.), translated in THE 
MARX-ENGELS READER 143, 144 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). He went on to develop the 
same basic idea at much greater length and with more polemical verve in KARL MARX, DIE DEUTSCHE 
IDEOLOGIE: I. BAND [THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY: PART I ] (1932) (Ger.), translated in THE MARX-
ENGELS READER, supra, at 146. 
43. WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 107. 
44. Id. ¶ 108. 
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  Here the fundamental fact is that we lay down rules, a technique, for 
playing a game [a practice, a mode of production based on real human 
interests], and that then, when we follow the rules, things don’t turn out as 
we had assumed [and we get alienated from ourselves and our interests]. 
So that we are, as it were, entangled in our own rules [and develop an 
ideology in order to cope with contradictions in society that we ourselves 
have brought about]. . . .  
  The civic status of a contradiction [bürgerliche Stellung des Widerspruchs—
“bourgeois status” would not have been a mistranslation], or its status in 
civic life [in der bürgerlichen Welt]—that is the philosophical problem.45 
J. Not One Thing 
This means that our form of life is not a single system, much less some kind 
of thing. Our agreement in form of life is neither total nor fixed. On the contrary, 
the liberty we enjoy in our language and put into effect by exercising our critical 
reason makes our form of life malleable and constantly changing in the same basic 
sense in which Marx considered our form of life to be malleable and changing. This 
applies even, and emphatically, to our tastes, our pleasures, and our senses. There is 
one sense in which our tastes, pleasures, and senses are not a matter of debate, 
namely, the sense in which they come naturally to us. There is another sense in 
which they are very much a matter of debate. We do in fact debate them all the time. 
We can acquire new tastes for new styles. We can be educated to appreciate things 
we detested as children. Some of us have no trouble managing temperatures in 
which others would freeze. Some of us can digest milk easily, others cannot. On 
Wittgenstein’s account, all human beings do share in a single form of life. But that 
single form of life is being modulated all the time in countless ways that affect our 
bodies as much as our minds and make for countless different ways of being 
human.46 It does not constitute a timeless essence, and it has no metaphysical unity. 
What Wittgenstein means by “form of life” must thus be sharply distinguished 
from the concept of “human nature” figuring so prominently in contemporary 
debates over the relative weight to be attributed to “nature” and “nurture” in 
explaining differences among human beings. That concept of human nature belongs 
squarely in the tradition according to which there has to be a reason for our ability 
to tell what we are talking about. It postulates the existence of some physical or 
biological essence that explains why we do what we do and think what we think. 
Critics commonly object that the differences among human beings are 
historically contingent and so variable that the notion of some identical human 
 
45. Id. ¶ 125. 
46. For an explanation of the sense in which human beings can develop different forms of life 
without abolishing the single form of life they share, see Stroud, supra note 7, at 515–18; compare Cora 
Diamond, The Skies of Dante and Our Skies: A Response to Ilham Dilman, 35 PHIL. INVESTIGATIONS 187 
(2012). 
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nature can only be regarded as absurd. They seek to explain our ability to reason by 
reference to culture.47 
On Wittgenstein’s understanding, neither of these positions makes sense 
because both of them look for explanations where none are to be found. When he 
speaks of our “shared human behavior” (gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise) and 
“form of life” (Lebensform) he is precisely not offering reasons for the concepts we 
deploy in our languages, or identifying causes for our behavior. His thinking simply 
has no room for biological, cultural, or any other kind of determinism. 
It is of course entirely possible that, precisely on the basis of the form of life 
we share, we carry out investigations leading us to conclude that in fact there is 
something that is the same for all human beings, say, the number of amino acids 
that go into the making of DNA (pleasing those who prefer explanations by 
reference to nature), or the ability to deploy symbolic systems (pleasing those who 
prefer explanation by reference to culture). But that is beside Wittgenstein’s point. 
Whatever may be found to be the same for all human beings is not to be confused 
with what he calls our “form of life” or “shared human behavior.” It may determine 
the nature of our bodies; it may determine the nature of our minds; it may even 
determine the nature of both our bodies and our minds. But our bodies and our 
minds are not to be confused with ourselves. We have a body and a mind. Proving 
that our bodies and our minds are determined in one way or another is not to explain 
our nature, but to eliminate it from consideration. 
Wittgenstein’s concept of human nature thus makes for a radical break with 
the classical dichotomy between nature and culture that has dominated our thinking 
ever since ancient Greek sophists first opposed physis to nomos.48 He insists that 
“[g]iving orders, asking questions, telling stories, having a chat, are as much a part 
of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing,” and he is at pains to 
stress that he is “talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, 
not about some non-spatial, atemporal non-entity.”49 What he calls “our natural 
history” differs deeply both from the conventional understanding of history (which 
excludes human nature), and from the conventional understanding of nature (which 
excludes human culture). How deeply it differs is impossible to grasp without taking 
him at his word when he claims that the Philosophical Investigations supply “remarks 
on the natural history of human beings; not curiosities, however, but facts that no 
one has doubted, which have escaped notice only because they are always before 
 
47. See generally PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (Irvington Publishers 1980) (1966); 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 
(Vintage Books 1994) (1966); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973); 
FREDRIC JAMESON, THE CULTURAL TURN: SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE POSTMODERN, 1983–
1998 (1998); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (2d prtg. 1980). 
48. As reported by Plato, particularly in the dialogues PLATO, GORGIAS, supra note 3, at 25–
131, and PLATO, PROTAGORAS, supra note 3. 
49. WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶¶ 25, 108. 
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our eyes.”50 The thinking behind that concept of natural history has yet to be given 
the attention it deserves, let alone be given its proper place in our study of the past.51 
K. Language and Reality 
Agreement in form of life thus yields agreement in language, and agreement 
in language makes it possible for us to tell what we are talking about. It does not 
decide what is true and what is false. It rather decides what makes sense and what 
does not make sense. It is not a matter of pure logic, but of what Wittgenstein calls 
“grammar,” in order to avoid confusing logic with the foundations on which logic 
rests.52 What we say can be true or false. Hence, we differ in what we say. That is 
where logic has its place. But in order to be able to say it, we need to be able to 
speak. That is where we are agreed, even when we do not agree in what we say—
indeed, especially when we do not agree. Without agreement in form of life, there is 
no agreement in language. Without agreement in language, there is no agreement in 
judgments. Without agreement in judgments, there is no sense. Without sense, there 
is no difference between true and false. If we cannot speak, nothing is being said. If 
nothing is being said, the distinction between true and false does not apply. 
Now you may very well say that this is unsatisfactory. Even if one agrees with 
Wittgenstein that agreement in judgments is required for communication, and that 
we do in fact agree in our judgments as he claims we do, and that we do so on the 
basis of our agreement in language and form of life, one may still want to know why 
that should be considered an improvement over other accounts of truth, knowledge, 
and reality. What entitles us to believe that the criteria we use in order to distinguish 
one thing from another are reliable? What could possibly make our agreement in 
language the foundation for our knowledge of reality? 
Wittgenstein never answers these questions. He rejects them.53 He does so 
because they are prompted by the very confusion he is trying to dispel: the 
 
50. Id. ¶ 415. 
51. On the fundamental significance of the concept of “our natural history,” see GARVER, supra 
note 6, at 149–58, 237–87. Cf. CAVELL, supra note 7, at 86–125. For an impressive attempt to write 
such a “natural history,” and for a good illustration of the obstacles preventing it from being written, 
see generally NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: SOCIOGENETIC AND PSYCHOGENETIC 
INVESTIGATIONS (Eric Dunning et al. eds., Edmund Jephcott trans., Blackwell Publishers rev. ed. 
2000) (1939). 
52. See Newton Garver, Philosophy As Grammar, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
WITTGENSTEIN 139 (Hans Sluga & David G. Stern eds., 1996). 
53. Note that “rejecting them” does precisely not mean “refuting them.” It rather means trying 
to pin down the meaning of such questions until it becomes clear that they have no meaning, so that 
there is nothing to be refuted in the first place: 
   In giving explanations, I already have to use language full-blown (not some sort of 
preparatory, provisional one); this is enough to show that I can come up only with 
externalities about language. 
   Yes, but then how can these observations satisfy us?—Well, your very questions were 
framed in this language; they had to be expressed in this language, if there was anything to 
ask! 
   And your scruples are misunderstandings. 
WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 120. Taking Wittgenstein to have rejected certain basic 
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confusion of agreement in what we say with agreement in the language we speak. The 
questions seem to have a meaning: they ask for an explanation of the relation 
between language and reality. They seem to be justified because there is in fact no 
guarantee that what we say is true; what we say may not agree with the reality at all. 
But that is not the point. 
Of course we can ask for an explanation of the relationship between reality 
and what we say. That is precisely the relationship we have in mind when we call 
something “true” or “false.” We call it “true” when it agrees with reality, and “false” 
when it does not. But the relationship between reality and something we say is not 
to be confused with the relationship between reality and language. Requesting an 
explanation of that relationship makes no sense. Our language does not rest on 
evidence, experience, or reasons to which we could appeal for justification. Hence 
there is no such thing as any justification of the language we speak. It is the other 
way around: our language is the basis on which we make use of evidence, experience, 
and reason in order to justify something we say. Looking for evidence or reasons 
with which to justify our agreement in judgments, language, and form of life is 
merely to abandon the agreement on which the very possibility of justification 
depends. 
Wittgenstein has many different ways of making this fundamental point. He 
says, for example, that our reasons soon give out;54 that his spade is turned when it 
hits rock bottom;55 that we follow rules blindly;56 that justification by experience 
comes to an end.57 But these are different formulations of one and the same basic 
insight. The insight is that our language is not only all we have, but also all we need. 
Trying to go beyond our language to “things in themselves,” or “pure ideas,” or 
 
philosophical positions is one of the easiest and most insidious ways of getting him completely wrong. 
He was keenly aware how difficult it was to stop his readers from going on this way: 
   The great difficulty here is not to present the matter as if there were something one 
couldn’t do. As if there really were an object, from which I extract a description, which I am 
not in a position to show anyone.—And the best that I can propose is that we yield to the 
temptation to use this picture, but then investigate what the application of the picture looks 
like. 
Id. ¶ 374. For specific instances of this “great difficulty,” see id. ¶ 305 (“‘But surely you can’t deny that, 
for example, in remembering an inner process takes place.’—What gives the impression that we want 
to deny anything?”) and id. ¶ 306 (“Why ever should I deny that there is a mental process? It is only 
that ‘There has just taken place in me the mental process of remembering . . . ’ means nothing more 
than ‘I have just remembered . . . . ’”). For an unusually clear description of the problem and 
Wittgenstein’s way of dealing with it, see Conant, Method, supra note 7. 
54. WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 211 (“‘No matter how you instruct him in continuing 
the ornamental pattern, how can he know how he is to continue it by himself?’—Well, how do I know?—
If that means ‘Have I reasons?’, the answer is: my reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act, 
without reasons.”). 
55. Id. ¶ 217 (“‘How am I able to follow a rule?’—If this is not a question about causes, then it 
is about the justification for my acting in this way in complying with the rule. Once I have exhausted 
the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is 
simply what I do.’”). 
56. Id. ¶ 219 (“When I follow the rule, I do not choose. I follow the rule blindly.”). 
57. Id. ¶ 485 (“Justification by experience comes to an end. If it did not, it would not be 
justification.”). 
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“real reality,” or “sense data,” and the like in hopes of putting our knowledge on a 
secure foundation is to set out on a course to pure meaninglessness: 
When I talk about language (word, sentence, etc.), I must speak the 
language of every day. So is this language too coarse, too material, for what 
we want to say? Well then, how is another one to be constructed?—And how 
extraordinary that we should be able to do anything at all with the one we 
have! 
  In giving explanations, I already have to use language full-blown (not 
some sort of preparatory, provisional one); this is enough to show that I 
can come up only with externalities [Äußerliches] about language.58 
There is no reason here and no justification.59 There is only, and simply, our 
agreement, not in opinions but in language. This is what is given: “What has to be 
accepted, the given, is—one might say—forms of life.”60 
L. Truth and Freedom 
Wittgenstein thus disagreed sharply with the long-standing tradition according 
to which we must be able to refer to something given in order to connect our 
definitions to reality. He turned the tradition on its head: we do not need to refer to 
reality in order to be able to talk about it; we need to agree in language in order to 
be able to refer to reality. First we draw the distinction between “red” and “not-
red” by means of a criterion. We do so on the basis of our natural ability to use 
criteria. Then we can tell if things do or do not correspond to our criterion. 
Otherwise there is no “object”—no thing—to talk about, not because red things 
 
58. Id. ¶ 120. 
59. It may be worth pointing out how richly Wittgenstein’s distinction between the realm of 
things that can be justified (the realm of thinking, saying, and doing something) and the realm of things 
that cannot be justified (our agreements in form of life, language, and judgments) resonates with the 
Protestant distinction between works and faith. Works (what we say and do) can be justified, but they 
do not save. Faith saves, but it cannot be justified. 
60. WITTGENSTEIN, PPF, supra note 1, § xi. ¶ 345. This is a very brief remark, and it belongs 
to the remarks that Wittgenstein did not consider ready for publication. One must therefore be careful 
not to place too much weight on it, and especially not on the fact that it refers to “forms of life” in the 
plural. GARVER, supra note 6, at 237–67, makes a strong case that, on Wittgenstein’s understanding, 
human beings share a single form of life, not many different forms. In Garver’s view, assertions to the 
contrary, though very widespread, are unnecessary, misleading, and often based on a careless reading 
of the relevant passages in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. In particular, Garver, id. at 251–52, 
points out that there is only a single passage in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS where 
Wittgenstein refers to “forms of life” in the plural, namely, the very passage under consideration here, 
and that there is an alternative formulation in which he substituted “facts of life” (Tatsachen des Lebens) 
for “forms of life—which shows, writes Garver, “that Wittgenstein was less certain about the 
employment of the term in this passage than in the others, and on at least one occasion thought that 
another expression would serve better.” Notwithstanding such uncertainties, this passage does show 
very clearly that Wittgenstein did not merely remove reference, particularly reference to data or 
evidence, from the foundations of our knowledge, but also had something else to put in its place, 
namely, acceptance of something given, regardless of whether it was to be called “form of life,” “facts 
of human life,” or “agreement in language.” 
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have disappeared from sight, but because we lack the ability to speak of them. That 
is how we establish the connection between our definitions and reality: 
The agreement, the harmony, between thought and reality consists in this: 
that if I say falsely that something is red, then all the same, it is red that it 
isn’t. And in this: that if I want to explain the word “red” to someone, in 
the sentence “That is not red”, I do so by pointing to something that is 
red.61 
This is a compelling account of truth. Wittgenstein insists that the difference 
between true and false is not a matter of opinion. It is a matter of what we say, and 
what we say is strictly subject to the tests of logic, evidence, and observation. There 
is no waffling here about our ability to expose lies, overturn illusions, tell the truth, 
and make contact with reality. Neither is there any denial of our ability to do the 
things that have traditionally been included under the headings of “objectivity,” 
“real knowledge,” and “science.” If I want to explain the word “red,” I point to 
something that is red, really red. That is what telling the truth about reality is like. 
Wittgenstein has no patience for the kind of relativism that makes it seem 
meaningful to say, “That is true for you, but not for me.” 
At the same time, this account of truth goes hand in hand with an account of 
liberty as radical as one could wish. It grounds our ability to tell the truth in our 
agreement in language, and in our language we are emphatically not subject to the 
tests of logic, evidence, and observation. We make the rules we follow when we 
speak, and they are rules of language, not of reality.62 Things do have an essence. But 
“[e]ssence is expressed in grammar.”63 Grammar gives us the rules on which the 
meaning of our words depends. These rules express our interests and our needs.64 
As far as their relationship to reality is concerned, they are entirely arbitrary.65 There 
is nothing in our language by which we could be bound except our own 
agreement—which is to say, in our language we are not bound by anything at all: 
not by reality and not even by logic.66 
 
61. WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 429; cf. id. ¶ 244 (discussing the way we establish the 
connection between words and sensations). 
62. But it is crucial to remember the sense in which we make those rules: we make them by 
learning and following them, not by deliberately establishing them as such. Normally we do not even 
know the rules we follow when we speak. 
63. Id. ¶ 371. 
64. “Concepts lead us to make investigations. They are the expression of our interest and direct 
our interest.” Id. ¶ 570. Here the connection between logic, grammar, concepts, and social practice is 
very close. 
65. “Consider: ‘The only correlate in language to an objective necessity [Naturnotwendigkeit] is 
an arbitrary rule [eine willkürliche Regel ]. It is the only thing which one can milk out of this objective 
necessity into a proposition.’” Id. ¶ 372. 
66. See id. ¶ 108 (“[H]ow can logic lose its rigour? Of course not by our bargaining any of its 
rigour out of it.—The preconception of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole inquiry 
around. (One might say: the inquiry must be turned around, but on the pivot of our real need.)”); cf. 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS [LOGICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL 
TREATISE] ¶ 5.473 (Charles Kay Ogden & Frank P. Ramsey trans., 1922) (Lat.) (“In a certain sense we 
cannot make mistakes in logic.”). 
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The freedom we have in our language is thus more basic than freedom in the 
sense of “the ability to live as you please,” as Cicero put it in a classic definition.67 
Freedom in this more basic sense is not to be confused with our ability to act on 
our intention by doing without hindrance what we want to do, much less with our 
ability to exercise some kind of power. Perhaps it is best described as freedom from 
the ability to act on our intention—what Stanley Cavell may have had in mind when 
he entitled his first book Must We Mean What We Say? Perhaps it is the freedom 
Luther meant when he distinguished “Christian Liberty” so categorically from the 
freedom to do anything whatsoever;68 Marx, when he looked with such contempt 
on the freedom of the bourgeoisie;69 and Nietzsche, when he looked with the same 
contempt at “the truth.”70 Having this freedom means being free, not to act on our 
intention, but to change what we are able to intend; not to achieve our goals, but to 
change the goals to be achieved; not to live as we please, but to change what pleases 
us—in short, to change our form of life. 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of truth and knowledge is thus both optimistic and 
profoundly subversive. It is optimistic because it affirms our ability to tell the truth 
about reality. It is subversive because it opens the door to a kind of relativism far 
more basic than, and fundamentally different from, what normally passes as such. 
It makes pure nonsense of the idea that there might be a fixed relationship between 
the language in which we speak and the reality of which we speak. It means that our 
history does not only consist of what we did and what was done to us, but also of 
changes in who and what we are. That is why Wittgenstein called it “our natural 
history.” It constitutes the essence of our humanity. Looking for our essence 
anywhere else is to seek safety in illusions that put both truth and liberty in danger. 
II.  LAW AND JUSTICE 
So much for Wittgenstein’s answer to the question, “How we can tell what we 
are talking about?” Now let me turn to the relationship between history, law, and 
justice. I will divide my consideration of this relationship into two steps. First, in 
Section II, I will maintain that law and justice are thoroughly intertwined—so 
 
67. “Quid est enim libertas? potestas vivendi ut velis.” 2 CICERO, PARADOXA STOICORUM 
[STOIC PARADOXES] (c. 48 B.C.E.), edited and translated in DE ORATORE: TOGETHER WITH DE FATO, 
PARADOXA STOICORUM, DE PARTITIONE ORATORIA 252, 284, ¶ 5.34 (H. Rackham trans., 1942). 
68. MARTIN LUTHER, DE LIBERTATE CHRISTIANA [THE FREEDOM OF A CHRISTIAN] (1520) 
(Ger.), translated in 31 LUTHER’S WORKS 328 (Harold J. Grimm & Helmut T. Lehman eds., W.A. 
Lambert trans., rev. ed. 1957). 
69. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, MANIFEST DER KOMMUNISTISCHEN PARTEI 
[MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY] (1848) (Ger.), translated in 2 THE MARX-ENGELS READER, 
supra note 42, at 469. 
70. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ÜBER WAHRHEIT UND LÜGE IM AUßERMORALISCHEN SINN 
[ON TRUTH AND LIES IN A NONMORAL SENSE] (1873) (Ger.), translated in THE NIETZSCHE READER 
114 (Keith Ansell Pearson & Duncan Large eds., 2006). For a classic formulation, see FRIEDRICH 
NIETZSCHE, ZUR GENEALOGIE DER MORAL [ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS] § 3.12 (1887) 
(Ger.), translated in FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS AND ECCE HOMO 
118–19 (Walter Kaufmann ed., Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1967). 
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thoroughly that trying to deal with one of them in isolation from the other impairs 
the meaning of both. Second, in Section III, I will build on this understanding of 
the relationship between law and justice in order to show that the history of law 
supplies a kind of knowledge that is essential for maintaining justice. 
A. Law and Justice Intertwined 
Up to this point I have limited myself to a generic consideration of the 
question how our definitions are connected to reality. I could afford to do so 
because I had only a single purpose: to clarify how Wittgenstein’s treatment of that 
question differs from every other treatment with which I am familiar. I also needed 
to do so, because the difference is so fundamental that its significance is next to 
impossible to grasp unless it is singled out for attention. But all of this was merely 
for the sake of laying a foundation. Now I need to explain the case that I would like 
to make on that foundation. This changes the focus of the investigation. Instead of 
asking the general question, “How can we tell how our definitions are connected to 
reality?” I need to ask the particular question: “How can we tell how our definitions 
of law and justice are connected to reality?” 
If one believes that Wittgenstein is right about the need for agreement in both 
definitions and judgments in order to be able to communicate by means of language, 
two basic answers immediately come to mind. One answer is negative: one cannot 
tell how our definitions of law and justice are connected to reality by reference to 
something given. The other is positive: one can tell on the basis of agreement in 
both definitions and judgments. 
These answers are all right as far as they go—and one ought not to 
underestimate how far that is. They rule out any possibility of founding our 
understanding of law and justice on some given thing. Seeing how many things have 
been proposed as candidates to serve as such a foundation—the will of God, the 
will of the people, the freedom of the individual, the idea of justice, natural law, 
human rights, sovereignty, the state, the categorical imperative, utility, the history of 
class struggle, custom, tradition, logic, natural selection, and so on—that is by no 
means insignificant. But it obscures two fundamental points. First, law and justice 
refer to the reality, not of things as they are, but of things we do; not scientific or 
theoretical reality, but practical reality. Second, we do not need agreement in 
judgments and definitions of practical reality in order to be able to communicate 
about law and justice; we need agreement in law and justice in order to communicate 
about practical reality. Agreement in law and justice is the agreement in judgments 
and definitions we need in order to communicate about practical reality. 
How so? At the most basic level, justice consists of making the right judgments 
about things to do and not to do. Making the right judgments means making the 
same judgments about all things that are the same, without respect to persons and 
their “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” to use a familiar formulation. If 
justice declares that you should pay your debt, then all debts should be paid, even if 
justice has spoken only once. Since making the right judgments entails making the 
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same judgments, justice is essentially related to fairness and equality. If the same 
things are judged differently only because of differences between the people and 
the circumstances involved, it strikes us as unjust, unfair, and inequitable at one and 
the same time. 
As you will hardly have forgotten, there can be no such thing as calling 
anything the same as anything else without the use of a criterion with which to judge 
what something is. This is what justice does. It judges what is right and what is wrong 
by using a criterion. Hence it is commonly portrayed as a blindfolded woman 
holding a scale in one hand and a sword in the other. She is blindfolded so that her 
judgment will not be unduly swayed by anything she sees. She holds a scale in one 
hand because that is the criterion with which she judges what is right. She holds a 
sword in the other hand because that gives her the power to execute her judgment. 
An actual scale, of course, is a criterion of justice that we can only rarely use 
in a real case. The number of criteria that could be used in other cases depends on 
the variety of cases, which is to say, indefinitely large.71 But one criterion stands out, 
because we use it whenever we distinguish things to do from things not to do. This 
criterion is what we call “good.” Metaphorically speaking, we place the good on one 
side of the scale of justice and the thing to be judged on the other. If the scale 
balances, we judge that the thing conforms to our criterion of “good.” If we have 
judged correctly, then the thing we call “good” is good, and if it is good, the 
judgment we have made is just. 
So much for justice—now for law. Law differs from justice as definitions of 
what is just differ from judgments of what is just. Law results from our having made 
a judgment. If we have judged correctly that some certain thing is good, our 
judgment is just. If it is just, it needs to be repeated whenever the same thing is 
being judged again. Hence there is no such thing as rendering a judgment without 
at one and the same time establishing a law. A law is the expression of our judgment 
in the form of a rule demanding that our judgment be repeated whenever we are 
judging the same kind of case. This is the sense in which law limits our judgment. 
But in another sense it is our judgment that constitutes the law, namely, the sense 
in which there is no law unless we use our criterion of “good” in order to judge 
what is right and what is wrong. 
This may appear to cast law and justice into a vicious logical circle. But it does 
nothing of the kind.72 Logically speaking, law and justice are entirely distinct, precisely 
 
71. The number is much larger than what is suggested by the familiar distinctions between 
distributive and commutative justice, public and private law, or civil and criminal law. 
72. Wittgenstein explicitly rebuts the charge of logical circularity. WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra 
note 1, ¶ 208 (“Then am I explaining what ‘order’ and ‘rule’ mean in terms of ‘regularity’?—How do I 
explain the meaning of ‘regular’, ‘uniform’, ‘same’ to anyone?—I’ll explain these words to someone 
who, say, speaks only French by means of the corresponding French words. But if a person has not yet 
got the concepts, I’ll teach him to use the words by means of examples and by exercises.—And when I do 
this, I do not communicate less to him than I know myself. In the course of this teaching, I’ll show him 
the same colours, the same lengths, the same shapes; I’ll make him find them and produce them; and 
so on. For example, I’ll teach him to continue an ornamental pattern ‘uniformly’ when told to do so.—
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as agreement in form of life is logically distinct from agreement in what we say. 
Logically speaking, no judgment implies any particular definition, and no definition 
implies any particular judgment. Logic does not come into question until there is 
something that can be true or false. But nothing can be true or false unless it has a 
meaning; nothing can have a meaning unless we are agreed in judgments and 
definitions; and no such agreement can exist if we do not agree in language. Hence 
there is no such thing as any law that can be followed or applied without judging 
the justice of that law. The reason is not, as it is all too often claimed to be, that 
every case is different, much less that there is always room for an exception from 
any general rule. It is that without justice, law is not merely arbitrary, capricious, or 
abstract, but not law at all. Law’s meaning depends upon the judgment establishing 
its justice. Without that judgment, law loses its standing as a rule. And where there 
is no rule, there can be no exceptions. The converse is just as true: there is no such 
thing as justice unless a law is being made, applied, or followed. The reason is not, 
as you might think, that justice is impossible to do unless there is a body of 
established rules preventing human beings from acting according to their arbitrary 
will. The reason is that the very concept of a just judgment is meaningless unless it 
results in the expression of a rule requiring us to make the same judgment whenever 
the same kind of case comes up again. Whether the rule ought to be written down 
or codified is a subordinate consideration. 
For those who are familiar with the Philosophical Investigations, this says no more 
than that the concept of a rule is meaningless unless the rule is actually being used. 
That can of course not stop us from calling it a rule even if it has lost its uses, or 
never had any use to start with. But if we call it a rule in such a case, then only in 
the secondary sense that Aristotle clarified by the example of a hand attached to a 
dead body. Such a hand cannot do anything that makes a hand a hand. It is only a 
hand so-called, in a sense that Aristotle calls equivocal, because it is not the same as 
that in which we call a living hand a “hand.”73 For the same reason, a rule that no 
one actually uses can only be called a rule in an equivocal sense: even if it is written 
in some code, it lacks precisely that element which makes a rule a rule. 
“Put a ruler against this object; it does not say that the object is so-and-so 
long. Rather, it is in itself—I am tempted to say—dead, and achieves 
nothing of what a thought can achieve.”—It is as if we had imagined that 
the essential thing about a living human being was the outward form. Then 
we made a lump of wood into that form and were abashed to see the lifeless 
block, lacking any similarity to a living creature.74 
 
And also to continue progressions. That is, for example, when given: •  ••  ••• to go on: ••••  •••••  ••••••. 
I do it, he does it after me; and I influence him by expressions of agreement, rejection, expectation, 
encouragement. I let him go his way, or hold him back; and so on. Imagine witnessing such teaching. 
None of the words would be explained by means of itself; there would be no logical circle.”). 
73. See 11 ARISTOTLE, supra note 8, § 1.i.11–12. 
74. WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 430. 
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This makes for a nice analogy to the relationship of law to justice: it is as if we 
imagined that the essential thing about law is its outward form, as if the letter could 
really be divided from the spirit and still remain a letter—as if the dead hand of law 
were actually law. We arrange the letters in the form of the dead hand, and then we 
find ourselves abashed to see that they lack any similarity to law. 
This is how law and justice are intertwined. Their intertwinement consists of 
the very combination of agreement in definitions with agreement in judgments that 
is required for communication in any case, except that in this case the 
communication does not lie in the realm of theory but in the realm of practice, and 
that it does not result in statements of fact, but statements of what we ought to do 
(or ought not to do) because we know that it is right (or wrong). Saying that they 
are intertwined is not saying that one can be derived from the other. They differ as 
deeply from each other as having rules differs from following rules, meaning from 
understanding, and thinking from acting. What justice means is what law says. Law 
embodies our agreement in definitions of what we ought to do, and justice embodies 
our agreement in judgments of what that is. But without justice we cannot make the 
law stick to reality. There would be nothing for law to say. And without law, justice 
would be random. That is, there would be no justice at all. That constitutes their 
intertwinement. It gives us the language we need in order to refer to practical reality: 
the reality that we intend to turn into actual reality because we judge it to be good. 
Needless to say, this account of law and justice is exceedingly broad and 
elementary. I must therefore point out that it is not intended to replace any familiar 
account. That would be preposterous. Law and justice have perfectly good 
meanings that are far more specific, down to earth, and technical than anything I 
said above. But there are two good reasons for offering an elementary account. One 
is to serve as a reminder that the normal meaning of law and justice is not the only 
one. The other is that law and justice may lose their normal meaning when times 
change. In such times an elementary account helps to protect their meaning from 
vanishing completely. 
B. Etymology 
It may be worth adding two pieces of corroborating evidence. One piece 
consists of the dense network of etymological relationships between the different 
words we use for speaking about law and justice in different languages.75 “Law” is 
related to “to lie,” as in “lying down” (not, fortunately, as in “telling a lie”), meaning 
that law is something that has been laid down and fixed in place. The etymology of 
 
75. The following details have been collected from FRIEDRICH KLUGE, ETYMOLOGISCHES 
WÖRTERBUCH DER DEUTSCHEN SPRACHE [THE ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE GERMAN 
LANGUAGE] (Elmar Seebold ed., 22d ed. 1989); HERMANN MENGE, MENGE-GÜTHLING: 
ENZYKLOPÄDISCHES WÖRTERBUCH DER LATEINISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN SPRACHE 
[ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF LATIN AND GERMAN] (15th ed. 1965); OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (2014), available at http://www.oed.com; ERIC PARTRIDGE, ORIGINS: A SHORT 
ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH (4th ed. 1966); and JACQUELINE PICOCHE, 
DICTIONNAIRE ÉTYMOLOGIQUE DU FRANÇAIS [ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF FRENCH] (1992). 
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Latin lex (“law”) and cognates of lex like “legal,” “loyal,” “legitimate,” and “legacy” 
is ambiguous. Lex may be related to legare, meaning “to dispatch someone or 
something,” but is perhaps more likely related to ligare, meaning “to bind someone 
or something,” in which case its cognates also include such words as “ligament,” 
“liable,” “liaison,” “lictor,” “lien,” “league,” “obligation,” “reliance,” and so on. 
“Religion” may belong to the same group of words, but the etymology of “religion” 
is also uncertain. Gesetz, on the other hand, is straightforward: it means something 
that has been “seated” or “set up”—the same idea as in “statute” and statutum. Νόμος 
and θέμις, Greek words for “law,” are equally straightforward. Νόμος is related to 
νέμειν, meaning “to assign” or “to distribute,” and θέμις is related to τιθέναι, meaning 
“to set up,” “to fix,” “to settle,” “to determine,” and the like. 
The basic meaning of all of these words is to impose some kind of restriction 
on our movements by laying something down some place, setting something up 
some place, dividing some place, preventing someone from entering some place, or 
preventing someone from leaving some place. 
“Justice” is obviously related to “judgment” and “to judge.” These words in 
turn derive from the Latin word ius, meaning both “right” and “law,” nicely 
confirming the intertwinement of law and justice. The original meaning of ius is said 
to be that of “a religious formula having the force of law,” which matters because a 
formula is by definition something that must be repeated in the same way, and 
because it establishes a relationship between law, justice, and religion.76 “Right” is 
obviously related to “righteous,” in which sense its meaning is close to “just.” But 
it is equally closely related to the German Recht and the French droit, whose meaning 
is closer to “law” than to “just”—except that the German word for justice, 
Gerechtigkeit, is directly derived from Recht. These words in turn are related to the 
word “to rule” and a number of cognates of “to rule” with a wide variety of 
meanings referring to objects we use as a rule (such as règle and “ruler”), the activity 
of using that object (as in richten, régir, corriger, “to correct,” and diriger, “to direct”), 
the person engaged in the activity (rex and roi, meaning “king,” and Richter, meaning 
“judge”), the place for the activity (Gericht, meaning “court”), and the results of that 
activity (such as Richtung, meaning “direction”). 
Δίκη, a Greek word for “law” that can also mean “right,” and δικαιοσύνη, the 
Greek word for “justice,” which can also mean “righteousness,” are similar to the 
German Recht and Gerechtigkeit in that they are derived from one and the same root. 
That makes it easier to explain the conceptual connection between these terms than 
it is in English, where the most important thing to know about “law” may well seem 
to be how different it is from both “right” and “justice.” This is also true, although 
to a lesser degree, in French, where the equivalents are loi, droit, and justice. Δίκη and 
δικαιοσύνη in turn are related to “digit,” “index,” zeigen (meaning “to show”), and 
dicere (meaning “to say”), which hints at the deep conceptual bonds between saying 
something, showing something, and following a rule. 
 
76. PARTRIDGE, supra note 75, at 325 (s.v. “jury (2)”). 
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The basic meaning of both “right” and δίκη is probably related to walking or 
guiding someone in the right direction. That seems appropriate, since walking in the 
right direction is just about as simple and obvious a case of correctly doing the same 
thing as one can imagine. We associate going in the right direction with doing the 
right thing in a similar way when we speak of “straightening someone out.” I will 
stop here and spare you any comments about “good,” “bad,” “evil,” and the like. 
Such etymological relationships do not of course constitute a reason for the 
intertwinement of law with justice that I have tried to explain above. But they do 
constitute “intermediate links” of the kind that Wittgenstein considered to be crucial 
for remedying our failure to understand the use of our own words.77 They give us a 
“surveyable representation” of law and justice by allowing us to “see connections” 
between law and justice that help to clarify their meaning.78 
C. Law 
The other piece of corroborating evidence is Ulpian’s definition of law. It is 
taken from the very first words of The Digest of Justinian: “Whoever wants to pay 
serious attention to law (ius) needs to know why it is called ‘law’ (ius). It is in fact 
named after justice (iustitia). For law (ius), according to the elegant definition of 
Celsus, is the art (ars) of what is good (bonum) and equal (aequum).”79 
This definition is deservedly famous. Renaissance humanists criticized it for 
misconstruing the etymology of ius.80 Etymologically speaking, that is entirely 
correct: ius is not derived from iustitia, but iustitia from ius.81 But it is also entirely 
beside the point. Ulpian was not interested in historical etymology. He wanted to 
explain the reason why law is called “law.” He thought the reason was necessary for 
understanding what law is. He found it in the relationship between law and justice. 
In his opinion, the meaning of “law” depended on the meaning of “justice.” His 
proof consisted of what he called “the elegant definition of Celsus.”82 
According to that definition, law is the art of what is good and equal. When 
we hear “art,” we think of artists and the skill with which they make or perform a 
work of art: painters, sculptors, singers, dancers, composers, architects, and so on. 
 
77. WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 122 (“A main source of our failure to understand is that 
we don’t have an overview of the use of our words.—Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A 
surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing 
connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.”). 
78. Id. 
79. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 1.1.1 (Theodor Mommsen & Paul Krueger eds., Alan Watson 
trans., Univ. of Pa. Press 1985) (530) (“Iuri operam daturum prius nosse oportet, unde nomen iuris 
descendat. est autem a iustitia appellatum: nam, ut eleganter Celsus definit, ius est ars boni et aequi.”). 
This translation is my own. 
80. See, e.g., CORPUS IURIS CIVILIS ROMANI: IN QUATUOR PARTES DISTINCTUM [BODY OF 
CIVIL LAW: IN FOUR DISTINCT PARTS], at Dig. 1.1.1, note c (Denis Godefroy ed., Sumptibus Societatis, 
Typis Balthasaris Christophori Wustii, Sen. 1688) (Ger.) (“Hoc ἔτυμον e Philosophia, non e Grammatica 
petitum est.”). 
81. PARTRIDGE, supra note 75, at 325. 
82. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 79. 
Fasolt_production read v6 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 6/28/2015  9:33 PM 
446 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:413 
We may also think of the skill with which craftsmen perform their craft. But we 
hardly think of lawyers. History has driven a deep wedge between our understanding 
of art and the ancient understanding according to which “art” was one of three basic 
kinds of knowledge, namely, knowledge how to make something (τέχνη in Greek, ars 
in Latin, and “technique” or “technology” in English), as distinct from knowledge 
of what things are (“theory”) and knowledge of what to do (“praxis”).83 
Strictly speaking, the “art” of law is the “technique” a jurist needs to know in 
order to “make” a case in law. But Ulpian seems to have used ars more loosely to 
refer not only to “technical” knowledge of things to make, but also to “practical” 
knowledge of things to do. For he identifies the good (bonum) and the equal (aequum) 
as the objects of the legal art, and these are objects of practical knowledge. If he had 
asked me to explain what he meant, I would have said: he meant that knowledge of 
law requires knowing how to judge a case justly by using the criteria “good” and 
“equal.” 
The same combination of “law,” “justice,” “judgment,” “good,” “equal,” and 
“practical knowledge” is evident in other definitions for which Ulpian is famous. 
This includes above all his definition of justice as “a constant and perpetual will to 
give each and everyone their due [(ius, ‘their law’ or ‘their right’)].”84 To put this 
definition in the terms that I have used above, justice amounts to a certain kind of 
will because maintaining the agreement in judgments we need in order to 
communicate about practical reality depends on our willingness to do so. This will 
has to be constant because communication about practical reality is always at risk 
of being undermined by disagreements in opinion. “Constant” here means “able to 
stand up to disagreements in opinion.” For the same reason it must be perpetual. 
“Perpetual” here means “able to render the same judgment all the time.” If the 
criterion for justice is used in different ways at different times, it loses its use and 
justice will vanish. Finally, justice must result in giving everyone their ius, because 
making the same judgment all the time is not enough if the judgment does not result 
in legal action. 
Ulpian immediately goes on to define the commands of law (praecepta iuris) as 
living an honest life (honeste vivere), not hurting one’s neighbors, and giving each their 
ius.85 Thus, justice consists of giving everyone their ius, and ius itself includes the 
command to give everyone their ius. The intertwinement of law and justice could 
 
83. For an influential statement of this threefold distinction see ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN 
ETHICS § 6.ii.1–4 (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1934) (c. 384 B.C.E.). Needless to 
say, the details are far more complicated, and were already recognized to be complicated in antiquity. 
84. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 79, at 1.1.10 (“Iustitia est constans et perpetua 
uoluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi.”). 
85. See id. at 1.1.10.1 (“Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste uiuere, alterum non laedere, suum 
cuique tribuere.”). The distinction between honestas and utilitas is perhaps the most fundamental 
distinction in Stoic moral philosophy. “Living honestly” does not merely mean “always telling the 
truth,” but something like “doing nothing merely for the sake of expediency.” For a classic account of 
honestas, see generally CICERO, DE OFFICIIS (Walter Miller trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1921) (c. 44 
B.C.E.). 
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hardly be spelled out more clearly. In Ulpian’s view, this includes living honestly 
and not hurting one’s neighbors. We might call at least the first of these 
requirements not law, but ethics or morality. No wonder Ulpian goes on to declare 
that jurisprudence (iurisprudentia) is “acquaintance (notitia) with things both human 
and divine and knowledge (scientia) of the just and the unjust.”86 This helps to make 
sense of his claim that jurists “are deservedly called priests, because we cultivate 
justice and profess knowledge of the good and the equal, separating what is equal 
from what is unequal, distinguishing the licit from the illicit, wishing to make people 
good, not merely by fear of punishment, but also by the incentive of rewards, 
teaching, if I am not mistaken, true, not feigned, philosophy.”87 That, I suppose, 
just about sums it up. 
III.  THE HISTORY OF LAW 
Now you may say: “Sounds great. But Ulpian is going overboard. How true is 
this so-called true philosophy? How far does this agreement in definitions and 
judgments actually extend? I am willing to concede that it is fundamental for 
meaning, understanding, and communication by means of language. But here we 
are not just talking about language. Here we are talking about law and justice—and 
we need law and justice only because so often we do not agree. Does that not mean 
that our so-called practical knowledge is a matter of opinion after all?” 
A. Ethics 
Answering this question requires a distinction between ethics and politics. 
Fortunately Wittgenstein had a firmly held and clearly stated view on ethics, namely, 
that it is impossible to say anything meaningful about it whatsoever. He said so early 
on in a letter he wrote to Ludwig von Ficker when he was looking for someone to 
publish the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. He explained that the point of the Tractatus 
was ethical precisely because it did not say anything about ethics: 
[T]he ethical gets its limit drawn from the inside, as it were, by my book; 
and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing that 
limit. In short, I believe that where many others today are just gassing, I have 
managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent 
about it . . . .88 
 
86. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 79, at 1.1.10.2 (“Iuris prudentia est diuinarum 
atque humanarum rerum notitia,iusti atque iniusti scientia.”). 
87. Id. at 1.1.1.1 (“Cuius merito quis nos sacerdotes appellet: iustitiam namque colimus et boni 
et aequi notitiam profitemur, aequum ab iniquo separantes, licitum ab illicito discernentes, bonos non 
solum metu poenarum, uerum etiam praemiorum quoque exhortatione efficere cupientes, ueram nisi 
fallor philosophiam, non simulatam affectantes.”). 
88. Cora Diamond, Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, in THE NEW 
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 6, 149, 152. Diamond’s translation is based on letter nr. 23, probably dating 
to October or November 1919, in LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, BRIEFE AN LUDWIG VON FICKER 
[LETTERS TO LUDWIG VON FICKER] 35 (Georg Henrik von Wright & Walther Methlagl eds., 1969) 
(Ger.). 
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He made the same point again in a lecture he gave in 1929: 
My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried 
to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of 
language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely 
hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about 
the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can 
be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. 
But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally 
cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.89 
As far as I am aware he never changed his mind about this fundamental issue. His 
reasoning was simple. Ethics is the most basic form of inquiry into practical 
knowledge. It deals with the question: “What is good?” Wittgenstein was perfectly 
willing to grant that it is not difficult to answer this question in a relative sense. In 
a relative sense, ethics asks merely what is good, provided you already have certain 
goals in mind. It deals with the relation between means and ends. That relation is 
straightforward. It can be figured out and put into words. But it is not really what 
we mean by “ethics.” Ethics does not have to do with means. It has to do with ends. 
It does not consist of asking: “What should I do, assuming I want X?” but simply 
and absolutely “What should I do?” “What is really valuable?” or “What is good?” 
It deals with absolutes. On Wittgenstein’s understanding, there is no hope of saying 
anything meaningful about that.90 
This makes Wittgenstein’s concept of ethics similar to his concept of 
agreement in language. As our agreement in language is the ground on which we 
can say things that may be called “true” or “false,” so ethics is the ground on which 
we can do things that may be called “good” or “bad.” As our agreement in language 
gives meaning to what we say, so our agreement in ethics gives value to what we do. 
Ethics in an absolute sense consists of this agreement. But precisely for that reason 
there is nothing we can say to explain why we call something “good” or “bad” in an 
absolute sense. Explaining why we call something “good” would require us to 
explain why “good” means “good.” Trying to give such an explanation would be 
exactly as futile as trying to give an explanation why “true” means “true.” 
Our practical reasoning thus runs out at the same point where our theoretical 
reasoning runs out: in our agreement in form of life. Trying to go beyond that point 
is meaningless. As we can only come up with externalities about language, so we 
can only come up with externalities about ethics.91 In this sense ethics cannot be 
taught. One can of course try to put ethics into words and say: “Ethics teaches an 
 
89. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, A Lecture on Ethics, in PHILOSOPHICAL OCCASIONS, 1912–1951, 
37, 44 ( James C. Klagge & Alfred Nordmann eds., 1993). 
90. Cf. RUSH RHEES, ‘Natural Law’ and Reasons in Ethics, in WITHOUT ANSWERS 91 (1969) 
[hereinafter RHEES, ‘Natural Law’ and Reasons in Ethics]; RUSH RHEES, Some Developments in Wittgenstein’s 
View of Ethics, in DISCUSSIONS OF WITTGENSTEIN 94 (1970). For an impressive attempt to show how 
it is possible to say something meaningful about ethics without doing violence to Wittgenstein’s 
thinking, see Diamond, supra note 88, at 149. 
91. Cf. WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 120 (quoted supra in notes 53). 
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absolute duty to do good.” One can call this a universally accepted truth and state 
it in the form of a categorical imperative, as Kant did. But it is a universally accepted 
truth only because, pace Kant, it states an externality. It does not say anything 
specific. If it is universally agreed that “good is what you should do,” then it is 
agreed only because it does not tell us anything about what is good. Ethics, you 
might say, commands an absolute duty to do no particular thing. 
If there is any merit to this line of thought, then all of our practical knowledge 
is specific to a particular time and place, and none of it is universal. Does it then 
follow that there is no kind of agreement in ethics at all? That follows no more than 
it follows from the absence of a universal language that there is no agreement in 
language at all. When Wittgenstein said that agreement in language is agreement in 
form of life, he of course did not mean that all of us speak the same language. He 
meant that there is no such thing as any language someone can speak that no one 
else can learn, and nothing someone can say that no one else can understand, no 
matter what language we have actually been taught to speak, no matter how 
unintelligible a foreign language may sound to us at first, in principle if not in 
practice. A language that can be spoken is a language that can be learned; a language 
that can be learned is a language that can be taught; and a language that can be 
taught is a language that can be translated. Learning a new language means learning 
a new agreement in judgments and definitions. For this is what is required in order 
to communicate by means of language. A universal language is not needed at all. 
It is similar with ethics. As agreement in language must not be confused with 
the existence of a universal language, so agreement in ethics must not be confused 
with the existence of a universal moral code. Agreement in ethics rather means that 
there is no such thing as an agreement in judgments and definitions of what is right 
and wrong that none of us can join, and nothing someone can do that no one else 
can judge, no matter how deeply we may differ in our particular forms of morality, 
and no matter how alien a different culture may seem to us at first. All of us know 
the difference between right and wrong. In that regard we are agreed in ethics. But 
agreement in ethics does not mean that all of us make the same judgments and 
definitions of what is right and wrong.92 In that regard we differ from place to place 
and time to time. 
B. Politics 
That makes law and justice essentially political. They do not exist in some 
Platonic heaven. They consist of agreements in judgments and definitions of what 
is right and wrong that are specific to specific communities of human beings at 
specific times and places. As agreement in judgments and definitions is not to be 
confused with agreement in language, so agreement in law and justice is not to be 
confused with agreement in ethics, as Ulpian seems to have done. As an actual 
 
92. RHEES, ‘Natural Law’ and Reasons in Ethics, supra note 90, makes this point extremely well. 
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spoken language is not to be confused with expressions of opinion, so law and 
justice are not be confused with expressions of opinion either. 
True, the judgments and definitions of which law and justice consist can be 
put into words and acted upon. Hence, unlike ethics, they can be taught and learned, 
and they can also be subjected to meaningful debate and argument. That makes it 
tempting to identify them with opinions. But subjecting law and justice to debate 
and argument means only that our judgments can be wrong. It is no reason to forget 
that in the area of law and justice our definitions are connected to reality in the same 
way as in all other areas: by agreement in both judgments and definitions. Without 
such an agreement, our statements are simply meaningless. They do not even rise 
to the level of opinions, let alone opinions that might be true or false, right or wrong, 
good or bad. Trying to give them meaning by reference to some kind of immediately 
given reality is just as futile here as everywhere else. Our self-interest, naked or not, 
may very well seem to be given, just as sense data and ideas are claimed to be. But 
that is only so because in fact we are agreed in judgments and definitions of what is 
right and wrong. Once you begin to ask exactly what your self-interest is, you quickly 
find that you run out of things to say—unless you draw on that agreement. Without 
it the very concept of self-interest is meaningless.93 
This does not of course mean that self-interest and expressions of opinion 
play no role in law and justice. It does mean though that law and justice cannot be 
reduced to self-interest and opinions, not because that would be wrong or 
contemptible, but because it would be meaningless. As law and justice lose their 
meaning if we try to found them on ethics or similarly absolute equivalents like 
natural law and human rights, so they lose their meaning if we try to reduce them 
to pure self-interest and mere opinion. There is no such thing as acting on self-
interest and expressing an opinion about right and wrong without belonging to a 
particular community of human beings who can communicate with each other 
about questions of right and wrong in a specific language because they are agreed 
in both judgments and definitions of what they consider to be right and wrong. This 
means nothing more, and nothing less, than that we have no criterion of justice 
beyond our agreement in judgments and definitions of what is good. 
I know of no one who explained more clearly why law and justice are essentially 
political than Aristotle. He did so early in the Politics, in a single passage that is as 
fundamental as it is unique in his writings. It is long, but worth quoting in full. I 
shall interpolate some of the original Greek terms in square brackets, along with 
various English equivalents, in order to prepare for an interpretation of its meaning 
below: 
[I]t is clear that the city-state [πόλις] is a natural growth, and that man 
[ἄνθρωπος : “human being”] is by nature [φύσει] a political animal [ζῷον 
πολιτικόν], and a man that is by nature [διὰ φύσιν] and not merely by fortune 
[διὰ τύχην] citiless [ἄπολις] is either low in the scale of humanity [φαῦλος : 
 
93. Mutatis mutandis the same is true with regard to the concept of values. 
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“slight,” “paltry,” “bad,” “worthless,” “poor,” “uneducated”] or above it 
[κρείττων: “stronger,” “better,” “braver,” “superior”] (like the ‘clanless, 
lawless, hearthless’ man reviled by Homer, for he is by nature citiless and 
also a lover of war) inasmuch as he resembles an isolated piece [ἄζυξ: 
“unyoked,” “unpaired,” “unmarried”] at draughts [ἐν πεττοῖς: “game of 
draughts,” “board for draughts”]. And why man is a political animal in a 
greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, 
as we declare, does nothing without purpose [μάτην: “in vain,” “idly,” 
“senselessly,” “at random”]; and man alone of the animals possesses 
speech [λόγος: “word,” “reason”]. The mere voice [φωνή], it is true, can 
indicate [ἐστὶ σημεῖον: “is a sign of”] pain [τὸ λυπηρόν: “the painful”] and 
pleasure [τὸ ἡδύ: “the sweet,” “the pleasant”], and therefore is possessed by 
the other animals as well (for their nature has been developed so far as to 
have sensations [αἴσθησις: “perception by the senses”] of what is painful [τὸ 
λυπηρόν: “the painful”] and pleasant [τὸ ἡδύ: “the sweet,” “the pleasant”] 
and to signify [σημαίνειν: “to give a sign,” “to point out,” “to announce”] 
those sensations to one another), but speech [λόγος] is designed to indicate 
[δηλοῦν: “to show,” “to make known,” “to prove,” “to declare,” “to 
signify”] the advantageous [τὸ συμφέρον: “the useful,” “the agreeable”] and 
the harmful [τὸ βλαβερόν: “the hurtful,” “the noxious”], and therefore also 
the right [τὸ δίκαιον: “the just”] and the wrong [τὸ ἄδικον: “the unjust”]; for 
it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that 
he alone has perception [αἴσθησις : “perception by the senses”] of good [τὸ 
ἀγαθόν] and bad [τὸ κακόν] and right [τὸ δίκαιον] and wrong [τὸ ἄδικον] and 
the other moral qualities [τὰ ἄλλα: meaning simply “the others,” “the rest,” 
or “the like,” not “qualities,” let alone “moral qualities”], and it is 
partnership [κοινωνία: “communion,” “fellowship,” “intercourse”] in these 
things that makes a household [οἰκία: “house,” “household,” “family”] and 
a city-state [πόλις]. 
  Thus also the city-state is prior in nature to the household and to each 
of us individually. For the whole must necessarily be prior to the part; since 
when the whole body is destroyed, foot or hand will not exist except in an 
equivocal sense [ὁμωνύμως: “having the same name,” “ambiguous,” 
“equivocal”], like the sense in which one speaks of a hand sculptured in 
stone as a hand; because a hand in those circumstances will be a hand 
spoiled [διαφθαρεῖσα: “utterly destroyed,” “killed,” “spoiled,” “harmed,” 
“ruined,” “disabled”], and all things are defined [ὥρισται: “divided,” 
“separated,” “limited,” “defined,” “marked out,” “settled”] by their 
function [ἔργῳ: “work,” “employment,” “occupation,” “deed”] and 
capacity [δυνάμει: “strength,” “power,” “ability,” “faculty,” “worth”], so 
that when they are no longer such as to perform their function they must 
not be said to be the same things [τὰ αὐτά], but to bear their names in an 
equivocal sense. It is clear therefore that the state is also prior by nature to 
the individual [ἕκαστος: “every one,” “each one”]; for if each individual 
when separate [χωρισθείς] is not self-sufficient [αὐτάρκης: “sufficient in 
oneself,” “independent of others”], he must be related to the whole state 
as other parts are to their whole, while a man who is incapable [μὴ 
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δυνάμενος] of entering into partnership [κοινωνεῖν: literally “to be a 
partaker,” “take part in”], or who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to 
do so, is no part of a state, so that he must be either a lower animal [θηρίον: 
“wild animal,” “beast,” “brute”] or a god [θεός]. 
  Therefore the impulse [ἡ ὁρμή: “attack,” “impetus,” “beginning,” “first 
start,” “effort,” “passion,” “impulse,” “setting out”] to form a partnership 
of this kind is present in all men by nature; but the man who first united 
people in such a partnership was the greatest of benefactors. For as man is 
the best of the animals when perfected, so he is the worst of all when 
sundered from law [νόμος] and justice [δίκη]. For unrighteousness [ἀδικία] is 
most pernicious when possessed of weapons, and man is born possessing 
weapons for the use of wisdom [φρόνησις : “being minded to do something,” 
“prudence,” “practical wisdom”] and virtue [ἀρετή], which it is possible to 
employ entirely for the opposite ends. Hence when devoid of virtue man 
is the most unscrupulous and savage of animals, and the worst in regard to 
sexual indulgence and gluttony. Justice [δικαιοσύνη] on the other hand is an 
element of the state [πολιτικόν]; for judicial procedure [δίκη], which means 
the decision of what is just [τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις], is the regulation [τάξις] of the 
political partnership.94 
This passage has become so commonplace that it has lost a lot of its meaning. It 
does not help that the translation leaves much to be desired, not because it is bad, 
but because it is difficult to render Aristotle’s meaning in English.95 I have quoted 
this passage so fully because it is anything but commonplace. Rather, it amounts to 
an account of the relationship between justice, law, and politics that combines the 
precision of Ulpian’s definition of law with Wittgenstein’s understanding of the 
relationship between language, nature, and human agreement. I have no intention 
of demonstrating this in detail. But I would like to render some of Aristotle’s points 
in terms that I have used above in order to clarify the sense in which law and justice 
are essentially political. 
Like Wittgenstein, Aristotle views language as something that is not only 
natural to human beings, but also constitutes the basic difference between human 
beings and other animals. Other animals can feel pain and pleasure, and they can 
communicate this to each other by expressing their pain and pleasure. But only 
human animals can say that pain is to be avoided as harmful, and pleasure to be 
sought out as advantageous, and communicate that to each other, for that requires 
language. For the same reason, only human beings can say what is right and what is 
wrong. 
 
94. 11 ARISTOTLE, supra note 8, § 1.i.9–12. 
95. The Greek equivalents point to some of the difficulties: Aristotle was not talking about man 
(άνήρ), but about human beings (ἄνθρωπος); he uses one and the same word (δίκη) for what the translation 
calls “justice” on one occasion and “judicial procedure” on another; conversely, the English uses one 
and the same word (“justice”) for what Aristotle calls δίκη (“law”) on one occasion and δικαιοσύνη 
(“justice”) on another; and where the English speaks of a “decision of what is just,” Aristotle speaks of 
τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις, which literally means “the crisis of the just,” and which, in the context of this Article, 
I would translate as “the use of a criterion to make a judgment that is just.” 
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Aristotle thus derives our ability to make what we call “moral” or “normative” 
statements about right and wrong directly from our natural faculties. He explicitly 
treats human beings as animals, and he uses the same word for our perception of 
good, bad, right, and wrong, as he does for our perception of pain and pleasure, 
namely, αἴσθησις. On his understanding, our natural ability to perceive things by the 
senses enters both into the difference between pain and pleasure and the difference 
between right and wrong. He leaves no room for the dichotomy between nature 
and culture—or facts and norms—that we have been trained to treat as fundamental 
to morality. Very much like Wittgenstein, Aristotle maintains that our form of life 
is grounded in our nature; that language is part of our nature; that there is a natural 
link between our agreement in sensations (in feeling pain and pleasure) and our 
agreement in language (in calling these sensations “pain” and “pleasure”); that the 
link is forged by a natural development that leads from perceptions shared by all 
animals to perceptions of good, bad, right, and wrong, which are unique to human 
beings; that this development constitutes our natural history; and that it culminates 
in the formation of political communities.96 
That explains why Aristotle considers politics to be a matter of human nature, 
and why he insists that it is prior to the individual. It is important to be clear about 
the nature of this priority. It is emphatically not priority in time. True, all human 
beings have a natural impulse towards living together in political communities, and 
they have this impulse from the beginning, long before such communities exist. But 
it takes more than a natural impulse to form such associations. Aristotle states 
explicitly what it takes, namely, agreement in what is called “good,” “bad,” “right,” 
and “wrong.” This, he asserts, is what “makes a household and a city-state.” Thus, 
even though language and the perception of good and bad are natural to us as 
human beings, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that we will live in 
households or political communities. In order to arrive at that conclusion, our 
natural ability to perceive right and wrong needs to be developed, exactly as our 
natural ability to speak needs to be developed, in order for us to learn how to speak 
a particular language.97 
 
96. Compare WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶¶ 244–45, the famous paragraphs in which 
Wittgenstein turns the conventional understanding of the relationship between words and sensations 
on its head: 
   How do words refer to sensations?—There doesn’t seem to be any problem here; don’t 
we talk about sensations every day, and name them? But how is the connection between the 
name and the thing named set up? This question is the same as: How does a human being 
learn the meaning of names of sensations? For example, of the word “pain.” Here is one 
possibility: words are connected with the primitive, natural, expressions of sensations and 
used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; then the adults talk to him and 
teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. 
   “So you are saying that the word ‘pain’ really means crying?”—On the contrary: the 
verbal expression of pain replaces crying, it does not describe it. 
   How can I even attempt to interpose language between the expression of pain and the 
pain? 
97. Note how closely the distinction between the natural impulse to form a polis and the 
agreement that constitutes a polis parallels Wittgenstein’s distinction between agreement in form of life 
and agreement in judgments and definitions. 
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This development proceeds in time.98 It does not begin with political 
communities; it ends with them. There was a time when there were no political 
communities. The development of political communities is natural, but it is not 
necessary and it involves founders. If it succeeds, it results in the formation of 
political communities whose members are agreed with each other in their judgments 
and definitions of what is right and wrong. But it may not succeed. Aristotle finds 
it entirely conceivable that some human beings may not be able to join political 
communities, and perhaps not even households. These he considers to be deficient, 
because they do not develop their nature to its full extent. In order to explain how 
they differ from human beings who do live in a polis, he uses the analogy of an 
isolated piece at draughts—not coincidentally the same analogy that Wittgenstein 
uses in order to explain the difference between the words “true” and “false” when 
they are being used in the language-game of telling the truth and when they are not 
being so used, except that in his case the game is chess.99 Aristotle finds it equally 
conceivable that some human beings may live apart from political communities 
because they develop beyond the level that normal human beings are able to 
achieve. These human beings he considers to be like gods. 
When Aristotle asserts that it is agreement on the meaning of right and wrong 
which makes a household and a city-state, he mentions households and city-states 
in the same breath. This matters, because it suggests that agreement on right and 
wrong is not necessarily political. It may be limited to households, in which case it 
is “economical.” But Aristotle does distinguish between households and city-states 
later on. The difference is that city-states have institutions that do not exist in 
households but only in political associations. These institutions consist of law and 
justice. For justice, as the English translation puts it, “is an element of the state,” 
and “judicial procedure, which means the decision of what is just, is the regulation 
of the political partnership.”100 The Greek is clearer. It says that justice [δικαιοσύνη] 
is political [πολιτικόν] because the organization [τάξις] of a political community 
[πολιτικής κοινωνίας] depends upon the law [δίκη], and the law in turn consists of 
judgments of what is just [τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις]. 
These are the words with which Aristotle ends the first chapter of the first 
book of the Politics. On my understanding, they make for an exceptionally clear 
statement, not only of the way in which law and justice are intertwined with each 
other, but also of the way in which both are essentially political. They are intertwined 
with each other because agreement in definitions of law is meaningless unless it is 
accompanied by agreement in judgments of what is just. They are essentially political 
because such agreements are made by specific communities of human beings 
 
98. See 11 ARISTOTLE, supra note 8, § 1.i.4–8. 
99. See WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, ¶ 136. I have no idea if Wittgenstein actually took the 
analogy from Aristotle. I suspect rather not. He read Plato with admiration, but according to RAY 
MONK, LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: THE DUTY OF GENIUS 496 (Penguin Books 1991) (1990), he 
“claimed proudly never to have read a word of Aristotle.” 
100. See 11 ARISTOTLE, supra note 8, § 1.i.12. 
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coming to specific terms on the meaning of law and justice. There is no reason 
whatsoever to believe that all human beings will come to the same terms. The terms 
will differ from time to time and place to place, and the communities of human 
beings will be as different from each other as the languages they speak. 
In Aristotle’s view, politics was essentially related to the institutions of law and 
justice. When he made the first systematic effort to survey the organization of law 
and justice in as many different political communities as possible, he was not 
engaged in an “empirical” investigation of their “constitutional law.” He was 
studying the essence of politics, justice, and law. Plato’s dialogue The Republic 
discusses the best state in order to arrive at a definition of justice, and the dialogue 
Plato wrote about the best state later in life is called The Laws. Plato and Aristotle 
both understood something that seems to have escaped Ulpian: no account of law 
and justice is complete without an account of politics. 
C. History 
Taking the intertwinement of law and justice to be essentially political has 
definite implications for historians of law. These implications are as deeply rooted 
in our practice as they are widely put into effect. But they are thoroughly obscured 
by the pathology I mentioned at the beginning of this Article. If our theory is to 
reflect our practice, instead of damaging its meaning, they need to be spelled out, as 
follows. 
As historians, we deal with changes in the affairs of human beings over time. 
In a standard formulation we are supposed to figure out what really happened. This 
complicates the general problem of how to make our definitions stick to reality. It 
does so because we cannot tell what happened in the past unless we consider two 
different ways of telling it: our own and that of those to whom it happened. These 
two ways differ from each other as the agreement in judgments and definitions we 
use in writing history differs from the agreement in judgments and definitions used 
by the people whose history it is. How ought we to address this difference? 
At this point it is easy to get confused by our profession’s standard teachings 
about evidence, context, interpretation, objectivity, anachronism, and so on. In 
order not to get confused, it may help to distinguish between saying or doing 
something and understanding what is being said or done. This difference is like that 
between understanding a language and speaking a language. To understand what is 
being said or done we need to know the agreement in criteria of judgment 
determining the meaning of what is being said or done. But we do not have to join 
in the agreement and use the same criteria ourselves. One can understand French 
without speaking French. 
That changes as soon as we are saying something ourselves. If we want our 
words to have a meaning, we do not merely need to understand someone else’s 
criteria of judgment; we need to use criteria ourselves. That means we have to 
choose: shall we use our criteria or theirs? Shall we speak French or English? 
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To take an example from the history of law, we can understand the people 
who maintained that slavery is a legitimate form of employment. In their judgment, 
slaves did not qualify as human beings in the full sense of the word. They used 
different criteria from us in order to decide who is and who is not a human being. 
The justice of slavery depends on those criteria. Understanding the people who used 
those criteria means knowing the criteria they used. But knowing their criteria does 
not mean that we have to agree with them.101 We can say: “I understand that they 
did not consider slaves as human beings. But in fact slaves are human beings, too.” 
In saying “I understand that they did not consider slaves as human beings,” we 
express our understanding of the criteria they used. In saying, “But in fact slaves are 
human beings, too,” we use our own criteria. 
Using our own criteria amounts to more than merely expressing an opinion, 
stating a fact, or conveying a piece of missing information, as we might very well be 
doing with interlocutors who do not know the meaning of “slave” or used the term 
mistakenly. It also means that we commit ourselves to the criteria we use. This is a 
political commitment. It establishes our membership in a political community 
united by agreement in judgments and definitions of what a human being is. It also 
places us in opposition to those who do not agree with our criteria. 
We do not make this commitment by saying, “We do not approve of slavery,” 
although we could say that, because in fact we don’t approve. We also do not make 
it by saying, “We commit ourselves to the equality of human beings,” although we 
could say that, too. If we said that, we would be making a commitment that is 
explicitly political. But here we only say that slaves are human beings, too, and we 
commit ourselves to nothing besides the truth of what we say. We need to say no 
more in order to affirm our membership in a political community. 
The community in which we thus affirm our membership need of course not 
be the present political community. It may be some other political community. It 
need not even be an actually existing political community. It may be a future political 
community existing nowhere besides our imagination.102 It also need not put us at 
odds with past political communities. In many areas of history we are united by 
criteria of judgment that have barely changed through the millennia, if they have 
changed at all. We all agree that when it rains, the earth gets wet. Most mountains 
have not moved. True, our concept of the sun has changed since Copernicus 
convinced us that it is not circling around the earth. In that sense what we call “sun” 
is something very different from what used to be called “sun” before Copernicus. 
Such differences can result in serious disagreements. In fact they did in early modern 
Europe. But they give us no reason to conclude that cultural and historical 
 
101. There is an important sense in which knowing the criteria does mean agreeing with them. 
In this sense, not agreeing with the criteria makes it entirely appropriate to say, “I do not understand 
how you can consider any human being to be a slave,” even if, in another sense, we understand perfectly 
well what proponents of slavery are saying. I cannot pursue this further here. But it would be dangerous 
to assume that the one sense is always easy to distinguish from the other. 
102. I thank Kathleen Davis for prompting me to make these points. 
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differences make for insuperable obstacles to communication by locking us up 
inside hermetically sealed communities, as Wittgenstein is frequently accused of 
having claimed.103 The sun still rises, shines, and sets. We still are born, grow up, 
eat, drink, sleep, dream, cry, laugh, sing, mate, fall in love, fight, get hurt, get angry, 
get sick, and die in the end. On that score there is no disagreement whatsoever 
between ourselves and any other community of human beings present or past. But 
no matter which criteria we use, as soon as we say anything at all, we make a 
commitment to some political community. 
The intimate relationship between telling the truth and committing oneself to 
a political community is nicely reflected in the etymology of the words “truth” and 
“fact” themselves. “Truth” is related to “trust,” “truce,” “troth” (a doublet of truth 
that signifies a pledging of fidelity), and Treue (“faithfulness,” “loyalty”), and “fact” 
means “something done” or “something made.”104 This etymology deserves to be 
respected. Facts are given to no one who has made no commitments to any criteria, 
and nothing can be said to be true, or false, without placing one’s trust on a political 
community. Such trust depends entirely on the conviction with which we maintain 
the facts as facts, the truth as truth. This does emphatically not make the truth a 
matter of opinion, nor does it make facts fictitious, for the reasons considered at 
length above. But it does explain why freedom of thought and expression is essential 
both to the health of a political community and to the maintenance of truth, as no 
one saw more clearly than John Stuart Mill, or explained better than he did in On 
Liberty. Without such freedom both politics and truth can only whither. 
History is rife with disagreements about criteria of judgment that have changed 
over time. The case of slavery—once thought to be a reasonable institution, now 
thought to be abhorrent—is merely one particularly clear example. Such 
disagreements divide the living from the dead. That poses a special challenge to 
historians. How are we to adjudicate disputes between political communities divided 
in not space, but time, pitting the dead against the living? 
According to an ancient saying, we are to say “nothing but good about the 
dead,” de mortuis nil nisi bonum.105 That is obviously not advice historians can heed. 
The best that we can do is what we have all along been taught: give a full hearing to 
 
103. For incisive treatments of this issue, see generally Stroud, supra note 7, and Diamond, supra 
note 46. 
104. See PARTRIDGE, supra note 75, at 195 (s.v. “fact”); id. at 740 (s.v. “true”). During the Middle 
Ages, the word “fact” was chiefly at home in the courts, where it was used to refer to “something 
someone did” or “a deed for which someone is responsible.” It was only in the early modern period, 
particularly in the wake of Francis Bacon, that the word “fact” lost its intimate relationship to the 
actions of human beings and acquired the meaning of “something entirely objective” or “something 
that just happens to be what it is,” quite apart from anyone’s having to do anything. For a highly 
pertinent study of this transformation, see Lorraine Daston, Baconsche Tatsachen [Baconian Facts], 1 
RECHTSGESCHICHTE 36 (2002) (Ger.). Also, see generally LORRAINE DASTON & PETER GALISON, 
OBJECTIVITY (2007). 
105. Widely quoted in varying formulations, originally attributed to Chilon by DIOGENES 
LAËRTIUS, LIVES AND OPINIONS OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS 33 (C.D. Yonge trans., Henry G. 
Bohn 1901) (c. 350). 
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all sides, refrain from judging until we have considered all of the evidence, and not 
judge recklessly. But that does nothing to absolve us from the responsibility for 
taking sides. The reason is not by any means that we have to express opinions on 
the morality of what the dead have done. It is that we differ from the dead over the 
meaning they gave to terms we use day in, day out: not only “good” and “bad,” 
“law” and “justice,” or “slavery” and “freedom,” but also terms like “property,” 
“inheritance,” “marriage,” “family,” “child,” “state,” “church,” “war,” “peace,” 
“love,” “friend,” “foe,” and “nature.” 
Such disagreements go to the very core of politics and freedom.106 There is no 
way to write the history of law without confronting them, and no way of 
confronting them without affirming our membership in a political community. 
Once we start writing history, we put the dead on trials in which we act as judge, 
jury, counsel for the defense, and prosecutor at the same time. That is a 
responsibility one does not need to take if one is dealing only with disagreements 
among the living. 
Historians who only want to understand the past do not want to take sides. 
They merely want to know the agreements by which the members of past political 
communities were united. Knowing what those agreements were means being able 
to figure out what those past people thought they were saying and doing.107 But it 
does not amount to writing history. In order to write history, we need to say what 
they were saying and doing. This is as different from understanding what they meant 
as understanding what they meant is different from agreeing with what they did. 
There is no way for us to say what they were doing unless we commit ourselves to 
the criteria on which the meaning of our words depends. This is a political 
commitment. Reducing history entirely to understanding the people of the past 
means making no commitment to any political community.108 That makes the truth 
about the past impossible to tell. 
D. Empirical Method and Conceptual Confusion 
I think this helps to understand why historians place so much emphasis on 
evidence. We hope that studying the evidence will relieve us of our responsibility 
for making judgments about the dead. Instead of saying, “This is what the evidence 
is saying in light of the criteria of judgment to which we are committed,” we would 
prefer to say, “This is what the evidence is saying. Judgment has nothing to do with 
 
106. Disagreements among the living can be as deeply rooted in the past as disagreements 
between the living and the dead, and they can be impossible to solve without invoking the dead. There 
are no disagreements that do not extend into the past at all. But the living can speak for themselves. 
The dead cannot. 
107. R.G. Collingwood defined this as the task of historians. R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA 
OF HISTORY (T.M. Knox ed., 1946). 
108. Perhaps one can make the same case for historians who try to write history entirely in 
terms of quantitative measures. Their method may seem to be precisely opposite to that of historians 
who only seek to understand. But pure understanding and pure measurement have one thing in 
common: both hold out the promise of freedom from having to make political commitments. 
Fasolt_production read v6 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 6/28/2015  9:33 PM 
2015] HISTORY, LAW, AND JUSTICE 459 
it. It is simply a fact.”109 That looks like a commitment to empirical research based 
on a proper theory of knowledge. But it proceeds from fear of taking responsibility 
for our membership in a political community. 
This fear is self-defeating. It fuels the pathology on which this Article is meant 
to gain a grip. Conducting empirical research means putting our criteria to use by 
making judgments about the meaning of the evidence. Once judgment goes out of 
the research, the result does not consist of knowledge. It rather consists of sentences 
that have no settled meaning. Trying to settle the meaning of such sentences without 
committing to any judgments is tantamount to falling under the spell of 
metaphysical illusions. Such illusions lead to debates with a characteristic 
combination of heat, profundity, and nonsense. They pit realists against idealists, 
skeptics against positivists, rationalists against voluntarists, historicists against 
transcendentalists, and so on. In the case of law they lead us to focus on such 
questions as whether law is a matter of ideas or social reality, principles or 
precedents, facts or norms, rules or decisions, form or substance, chance or 
deliberation, theory or practice, objective values or subjective opinions, will or 
reason, nature or history, and so on—and this is how such illusions divide us into 
schools of thought like those I mentioned in the introduction. 
Debates like that can never end. They always recur in a new guise as soon as 
any party seems to have won. Wittgenstein captured the logic of such debates with 
admirable clarity: 
[W]e’re tempted to say that our way of speaking does not describe the facts 
as they really are. As if, for example, the proposition “he has pains” could 
be false in some other way than by that man’s not having pains. As if the 
form of expression were saying something false, even when the 
proposition faute de mieux asserted something true. 
  For this is what disputes between idealists, solipsists and realists look 
like. The one party attacks the normal form of expression as if they were 
attacking an assertion; the others defend it, as if they were stating facts 
recognized by every reasonable human being.110 
There are good reasons why we are “tempted to say that our way of speaking does 
not describe the facts as they really are.” The most obvious is that our judgments 
can be wrong. The most compelling is that agreement in judgments can fall apart 
when political communities are subjected to rapid social change. Such reasons make 
the fear of taking responsibility for judgments embedded in our use of criteria 
completely understandable. They explain why human beings sometimes conclude 
that they had better withdraw their trust from judgments as thoroughly as Descartes 
did during the Thirty Years War.111 They also help to understand why some of the 
most spectacular advances in the name of pure objectivity were made in the 
 
109. Cf. Daston, supra note 104. 
110. WITTGENSTEIN, PI, supra note 1, at ¶ 402. 
111. RENÉ DESCARTES, DISCOURS DE LA MÉTHODE [DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD] (1637) 
(Fr.), translated in 1 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES, supra note 14, at 109, 127. 
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aftermath of social collapse on a grand scale. Think of the invention of logic and 
science in ancient Greece after the collapse of Mycenaean civilization; the invention 
of the systematic logical analysis of writing in Latin Europe after the collapse of the 
Carolingian Empire; and the invention of differential calculus and the mathematical 
analysis of nature after the collapse of the church amidst religious warfare. 
As these examples show, agreements on new criteria of judgment established 
in a concerted effort to put an end to chaos by substituting pure objectivity for 
judgment can last for many centuries. The very novelty of the agreement makes it 
only too easy to confuse what is in fact the formation of a new political community 
with the discovery of objective facts on the foundation of a sound theory of 
knowledge, all the more so since new criteria invariably lead to discoveries that could 
not have been made without them. Real progress can be made that way. But none 
of this means that those objective facts can be maintained as true without political 
agreement. Whatever debates might seem to have been settled by the formation of 
new political communities can be revived at any moment in new and more 
destructive forms as soon as new discoveries result in doubts that go beyond mere 
disagreements in opinion and prove impossible to settle by reference to objectivity. 
Such doubts resuscitate the fear of taking responsibility for judgment, the 
temptation to put metaphysical illusions into the place of truth, and the debates 
provoked by those illusions. 
Pursuing such debates all the way to the bitter end wreaks havoc with politics. 
The havoc can take the form of anarchy and civil war. But it can also be embalmed 
in institutions like sovereignty and the distinction between a private and a public 
sphere. Both sovereignty and the distinction between the private and the public 
sphere are lasting institutional expressions of Europe’s failure to take political 
responsibility for the havoc it wrought in the name of God by waging religious war. 
As the distinction between private and public entitles individuals to disavow 
responsibility for their religious faith, so sovereignty entitles sovereigns to disavow 
their responsibility for law. As we are not obliged to answer to anyone for our 
beliefs, so sovereigns are not obliged to answer to anyone for their decisions. The 
same is true of evidence. The absolute authority that evidence was given in early 
modern times is analogous to sovereignty: it answers to no one.112 There really is a 
line that leads from the assertion of pure objectivity to the formation of political 
communities whose members surrender their judgment to rulers whose will is law 
by definition. 
You may conclude that I intend to change how the history of law is written. 
That would be a misunderstanding. As far as I can tell, in practice historians have 
always done what I have tried to explain: make judgments about the meaning of the 
evidence and affirm their membership in a political community by trying to tell the 
truth about the past.113 They may not know that this is so, and they may loudly 
 
112. Cf. Daston, supra note 104. 
113. For examples of such affirmations by telling the truth about the past, consider ENNIO 
CORTESE, LA NORMA GIURIDICA: SPUNTI TEORICI NEL DIRITTO COMUNE CLASSICO [THE RULE OF 
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protest that it is not. But it is. As Arnaldo Momigliano once put it with a sarcastic 
flourish, “What history-writing without moral judgments would be is difficult for 
me to envisage, because I have not yet seen it.”114 I could hardly agree more. There 
is no history of law without agreement in criteria of judgment, and there is no 
agreement in criteria of judgments without committing oneself to a political 
community. What makes the work of historians compelling is never the absence of 
any judgments, but the presence of judgments embedded in criteria used for no 
other purpose than to make statements of fact. Good histories of law make their 
commitment to a particular political community without saying so at all. Such 
histories cannot be written by distinguishing empirical research from moral 
judgment. They rather require what Hannah Arendt called using the “imagination 
consciously as an important tool of cognition.”115 
CONCLUSION 
Stanley Cavell has written that searching for criteria amounts to making 
“claims to community.”116 Writing history means making claims to community with 
the past. It is not only a matter of evidence and chronology but also of judging 
where our agreements with the dead come to an end. This is why writing the history 
of law amounts to writing the history of justice at one and the same time. This is 
also why the history of law furnishes a kind of knowledge that is essential for 
maintaining justice. Writing the history of law means making a commitment to a 
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particular political community by settling disagreements with the dead. It furnishes 
a kind of knowledge that is essential for maintaining justice because it gives a 
meaning to “law,” “justice,” and “politics,” without which law, justice, and politics 
fall to the judgment of the dead or that of arbitrary rulers. It does not consist of 
writing about justice, but of making judgments in writing about the history of law. It 
is neither to be confused with expressions of opinion nor with statements of pure 
fact: not expressions of opinion, because it requires statements of fact; not 
statements of pure fact, because there are no facts to state without agreement in the 
judgments that make a political community. 
